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How Long is Forever This Time? The Broken 
Promise of Bankruptcy Trusts 
S. TODD BROWN† 
Imagine a Medicare system in which the medical 
providers that submit the most reimbursement claims
determine the criteria for reimbursement, have the power to
veto any plan for auditing the claims they submit, and
effectively control the appointment of those responsible for 
overseeing reimbursements and audits. Would claim 
criteria be designed to strike an optimal balance between 
excluding specious claims and managing administrative
costs, or would the criteria focus on making the process
most efficient for medical providers? Would we see more
robust audits, or would they largely abandon claim audits?  
The preceding hypothetical mirrors the manner in
which bankruptcy trusts are established. Section 524(g) of
the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the entry of an injunction 
that channels all of a debtor’s asbestos-related liabilities to
a bankruptcy trust, which is established by the debtor to
pay all valid current and future asbestos claims. Due to an
oversight in the design of section 524(g), however, current
claimants enjoy the power to veto any plan.1 Given this 
power, the lawyers who speak for the largest blocks of
current claimants have the power to dictate trust claim 
† Associate Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School. The Author wishes to thank
Christine Bartholomew, Mark Behrens, Kirk Hartley, Peter Kelso, Stuart 
Lazar, Chris Pashler, Marc Scarcella, Jack Schlegel, and Jim Wooten for their
insight and input concerning this project. Special thanks to my research
assistant, Logan Geen, for his assistance in this project. Any errors or
omissions, of course, are the author's own.  
1. As is more fully outlined in Parts I.B.3 and II, this veto power stems from
the requirement that at least 75% of current claimants vote in favor of the plan
in order for the channeling injunction to be issued. S. Todd Brown, Section
524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos Bankruptcy
Paradox, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 841, 855-64, 902-04 (2008) (explaining how
the design of section 524(g) provides lead plaintiffs’ counsel with an unassailable

































538 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61
qualification criteria and settlement values, control key
appointments, and structure trust governance provisions to
preserve their influence over the trusts post-confirmation.2 
The danger in this design is that current claimants will 
insist upon relaxed standards and inflated payments for
their own claims and leave little for unknown future vic-
tims.3 Ensuring equality of distribution to all claimants who 
are bound by the plan of reorganization—current and fu-
ture—is both a “‘central policy of the Bankruptcy Code’”
generally4 and the “central purpose”5 of section 524(g) spe-
cifically. To that end, section 524(g) requires the appoint-
ment of an independent legal representative for future vic-
tims.6 Moreover, in order to issue the channeling injunction,
the district court must first determine that the injunction is
“fair and equitable” to future victims7 and that the trust 
will “value, and be in a financial position to pay, present 
claims and future demands that involve similar claims in
substantially the same manner.”8 
Notwithstanding the statutory protections for future
victims, the available public data shows that few trusts that
have processed their initial claims remain in position to 
ensure equitable payments to future victims. Payments
from the most recently established trusts declined as much
2. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
3. As the Third Circuit recently observed, “the trusts place the authority to
adjudicate claims in private rather than public hands, a difference that has at
times given us and others pause, since it endows potentially interested parties
with considerable authority.” In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 362
(3d Cir. 2012).  
4. In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 120-21 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012)
(quoting In re Combustion Eng’g Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 239 (3d Cir. 2004)) (“This
emphasis on the equality of distribution among creditors is highlighted within
the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(g) and 1123(a)(4) of the Code.”). 
5. In re Plant Insulation Co., 469 B.R. 843, 860 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2012)
(“The central purpose of section 524(g) is the equal treatment of present and
future asbestos claims. This policy is enunciated clearly in both the language
and legislative history of the statute.”). 
6. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2006). 
7. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii). 


























      
   
    
  
    
  




   
 
 5392013] BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
as 90% following the initial claim processing period,9 and
the median payment percentage10 across the trusts surveyed
for this paper has reached an all-time low of 14%.11 Roughly 
two-thirds of the trusts have reduced payments to claimants 
at least once since 2010, resulting in per-claim payment
reductions of up to 93.33% in that time.12 In sum, although
trusts are established on the promise to pay all current and
future victims equitably, this promise has already been
broken at all but a few trusts. 
The threat to future victims has become pressing given
the dramatic growth of the bankruptcy trust system. To 
date, nearly sixty bankruptcy trusts have been established 
or are in the process of being established.13 These trusts
distributed more than $14 billion to claimants from 2006
through 2011, leaving only $18 billion in assets14 to satisfy
the claims submitted to them over the next four decades.15 
9. See Notice to Holders of TDP Determined Lummus Asbestos PI Trust
Claims (June 13, 2011), available at
http://www.abblummustrust.org/Files/20110616_Lummus_Letter_To_TDP_Clai 
C_Holders.pdf (reducing payment percentage from 100% for claims processed
through August 2, 2010, to 10% for newly filed claims).  
10. The payment percentage is the amount of a claim’s assigned value that is
actually paid by the trust. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
 11. See infra Appendix A (Payment Percentages). 
12. Id. (twenty-two of the thirty-two trusts included in the study paying at
historic lows). One trust that has not reduced its initial payment percentage,
Combustion Engineering, was the product of a pre-packaged bankruptcy 
settlement that overtly front-loaded payments pursuant to a two-tier trust. See
infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text. If these payments are taken into
account, twenty-three of the thirty-two trusts studied are currently paying
claims at historically low levels.  
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ASBESTOS INJURY COMPENSATION: THE
ROLE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 3 (2011) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]. 
14. Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts: A 2012
Overview of Trust Assets, Compensation & Governance, MEALEY’S ASBESTOS
BANKR. REP., June 2012, at 1, 2. This amount excludes the roughly $12 billion
set aside for trusts that have not yet become active. Id. 
15. See AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES, CURRENT ISSUES IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2 
(2006) (“Although occupational exposure to asbestos was significantly reduced
following the establishment of Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) requirements in the early 1970s, asbestos diseases are expected to
manifest at least through 2050 in the United States, and longer in several other
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As more defendants leave the tort system and establish
bankruptcy trusts, future victims will increasingly look to
the trust system for payment. If current trends and 
practices hold, however, bankruptcy trusts will pay future
victims a fraction of the amount paid to initial trust 
claimants.  
This Article addresses some of the reasons for this fail-
ure and outlines measures for improving trust governance
and performance. Part I provides a basic summary of proc-
ess for establishing a bankruptcy trust under section 524(g)
and an overview of features common across the trusts. Part 
II outlines the misalignment of private incentives and the 
policy objectives of section 524(g) and identifies specific re-
sulting weaknesses in trust criteria and quality controls. 
Part III analyzes the extent to which the prevailing trust 
model undermines future victims’ interests, some common 
defenses of the bankruptcy trust system, and whether fu-
ture trusts that follow the same model can be confirmed as
consistent with the dictates of due process and the express
terms of section 524(g). Part IV advances a model for 
streamlining and improving oversight of bankruptcy trust
submissions and payments, which, in turn, should better 
protect future victims’ interests in existing and future
trusts. 
I. THE ORIGIN, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE OF BANKRUPTCY 
TRUSTS 
A. The Objectives of the Bankruptcy Trust System 
The twin objectives of bankruptcy law—maximizing the
pool of assets available for distribution to creditors and 
ensuring that this distribution is equitable—are reflected in
every Anglo-American bankruptcy law dating back to the 
Statute of Elizabeth.16 Even the decision to place the
exclusive power to adopt a uniform national bankruptcy law
with the federal government through the Bankruptcy
Clause had its origins in the fear that individual states
would pass laws allowing inequitable discharges and
distributions that favored their citizens ahead of the
16. 1571, 13 Eliz., c. 5, § 1 (Eng.) (prohibiting transfers made with the



































 5412013] BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
citizens of other states.17 The substantive provisions of the
modern Bankruptcy Code—including the automatic stay, 
the power to avoid preferences and fraudulent conveyances,
and the absolute priority rule—work collectively to 
maximize assets and ensure equitable distributions to 
creditors.
Procedurally, federal bankruptcy law advances these 
objectives by empowering creditors to protect their
interests, both individually and collectively, no matter how
large or small their individual stakes in the case. All
creditors have the right to object to proposals that affect 
their interests18 and vote on any proposed reorganization
plan.19 The Bankruptcy Code also contemplates independent
appointments of trustees, examiners and official creditor
committees to protect the interests of all creditors against 
encroachment by repeat players and more influential 
creditors.20 
This procedural design works relatively well in the
typical Chapter 11 corporate restructuring of the debtor’s 
current assets and liabilities. What if the ability to
reorganize hinges upon the debtor’s ability to address the 
claims of not only current creditors but also currently
unknowable future creditors? These creditors cannot receive
sufficient notice to satisfy due process,21 and it is unlikely 
that their interests will be fairly represented by other
17. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 1102 (1833), available at
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/story/sto-316.htm.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2006). 
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a). 
20. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1106. 
21. With the Third Circuit’s recent rejection of Avellino & Bienes v. M.
Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), it appears
well settled that asbestos personal injury claims qualify as “‘claims’” subject to
discharge under the Bankruptcy Code. Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re
Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc). Nonetheless,
claims may be discharged in bankruptcy only to the extent consistent with due
process, and victims that have no reason to be aware of their potential asbestos
personal injury claims against a debtor are unlikely to have a sufficiently
colorable claim at the time of discharge or knowledge of the need to protect their
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parties to the case.22 Yet forcing the debtor into
liquidation—as may be required if these future creditors’
claims cannot be discharged in the reorganization plan— 
may ensure that they will receive nothing from the
bankruptcy estate.23 
The bankruptcy trust model was adopted in the first 
asbestos bankruptcies to resolve this problem. This model
included features that provided courts with a basis for 
binding future victims notwithstanding their absence and to 
protect them from overreaching by other parties in
interest.24 Consistent with other proceedings in which
interested parties are unable to speak on their own behalf, 
courts appointed legal representatives to speak for future
victims.25 These representatives assisted current parties in
interest in the negotiation of the debtors’ reorganization
plans, which included the establishment of bankruptcy
trusts funded by the debtors’ securities, insurance 
recoveries, and other assets.26 To ensure that the debtors 
22. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042-43 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
future claimants’ conflicting interests with the debtor and current asbestos
creditors). Similar concerns about the inherent conflicts of interests between
current and future victims animated the Supreme Court’s rejection of asbestos
class action settlements. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
 23. See In re Plant Insulation Co., 469 B.R. 843, 852-53 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
2012). This concern is reflected in Judge Lifland’s analysis of the due process
question in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy: 
Finally, it is worthwhile to remember who due process will serve in this
reorganization. The goal of the Plan and the purpose of the Injunction
is to preserve the rights and remedies of those parties, who by an
accident of their disease cannot even speak in their own interest. The
impracticable, if not impossible version of due process envisioned by the
Objectors would effectively destroy these rights and remedies. Theories
and standards of “due process” are nothing more than the human effort
to make the inchoate notions of justice and equity real and tangible to 
parties who stand before a court of law. The Objectors’ “due process”, 
which would deny asbestos victims justice and equity, is not a “due
process” at all. 
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 627 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
24. See Brown, supra note 1, at 896-97. 
25. See Frederick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort






























   
  








 5432013] BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
could satisfy the requirements for confirmation,27 the courts
issued permanent injunctions channeling all future tort 
claims against the debtor to the trusts.28 Although this
process was controversial, it reflected a pragmatic
expansion of the basic principles of Chapter 11 generally— 
preservation of the going concern value of the debtor and
equitable distribution to creditors with similar rights—to
include future asbestos personal injury victims.
An immediate problem with this approach was its
uncertain foundations in the Bankruptcy Code. Nothing in
the code at the time expressly authorized the appointment 
of a legal representative for future victims, the inclusion of
future claims in any distribution scheme, or the issuance of 
an injunction that limited future plaintiffs’ recovery rights
to the bankruptcy trust.29 This uncertainty played a
significant role in the adoption of section 524(g).30 
27. If asbestos defendant-debtors are unable to free themselves of liability to
unknown future claimants, they are unlikely to satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11)
(2006). This section requires a finding that the debtor’s emergence from
bankruptcy “is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor” in order for the court to confirm
the plan. Id. Although this standard is not high in practice, the failure to resolve
this unknown future asbestos liability has historically raised sufficient doubt
concerning the debtor’s risk of insolvency post-confirmation to preclude
confirmation. See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1119 (7th Cir.
1984); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
28. See Mark D. Plevin et al.,  The Future Claims Representative in
Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and
Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 271, 277 (2006) (summarizing the Johns-Manville approach). 
29. Brown, supra note 1, at 853 (“The legal foundations for the trust-
injunction mechanism in Manville and other early cases—the court’s equitable
authority and largely unsettled interpretations of key provisions of the Code— 
were, at best, unstable.”). 
30. 140 CONG. REC. H. 10,765-66 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (noting lingering
uncertainty over the legal foundations of the bankruptcy trust injunction
approach); Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114,
126 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“The Manville Trust was the basis for Congress’
effort to deal with the problem of asbestos claims on a national basis, which it
did by enacting § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Bankruptcy
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B. The Section 524(g) Bankruptcy Process 
Consistent with its origins, the basic purposes of section
524(g) are to preserve the going concern value of asbestos
defendant-debtors, provide legitimate victims with prompt 
compensation, and afford similar current and future victims 
with substantially similar compensation.31 As Judge
Fitzgerald, who has presided over several asbestos-related 
bankruptcies, recently observed: 
Ultimately, what Congress was attempting to do with § 524(g)
was to ensure that everyone unfortunate enough to contract
asbestos-related illnesses as a result of exposure to a bankruptcy
debtor’s products, thereby becoming entitled to compensation from 
that debtor, be subject to substantially the same treatment in
bankruptcy. Thus, Congress decided that whether one is currently 
a victim of such an illness or whether one will not fall ill for many
more years, for bankruptcy-related purposes, a victim’s
compensation should not depend on how quickly he or she 
manifests illness.32 
To that end, section 524(g) seeks to provide future
victims an independent voice in the proceedings and 
requires a finding that the proposed plan and trust are fair
and equitable before issuing a channeling injunction.
Among other things, section 524(g) requires: 
• The appointment of a legal representative to speak 
on behalf of those who will assert asbestos personal 
injury demands in the future;33 
• A judicial finding that channeling the liabilities of
the parties responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries to
the trust is fair and equitable in light of the responsi-
ble parties’ contributions to the trust;34 
• “[R]easonable assurance that the trust will value,
and be in a financial position to pay, present claims
31. In re Plant Insulation Co., 469 B.R. 843, 859 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2012)
(“Congress had three purposes in enacting section 524(g): equal treatment of
present and future asbestos claimants; preservation of going-concern value; and
prompt payment of meritorious asbestos claims.”).
 32. In re Flintkote Co., No. 04-11300 (JFK), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5888, at *69-
70 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 21, 2012) (internal citations omitted). 
33. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2006). 






























       
    
 
 5452013] BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
and future demands that involve similar claims in
substantially the same manner;”35 and
• The approval of at least 75% of current asbestos 
claimants entitled to vote on the plan.36 
Collectively, these requirements were intended to 
protect future claimants’ interests by providing them with
an independent voice during the proceedings, demanding
specific judicial findings concerning questions that affect
their interests, and aligning their interests with the current
claimants, who must overwhelmingly support the plan.37 
Assuming these and the other conditions of section 524(g)
are satisfied, the bankruptcy court may confirm the plan, 
and the federal district court is authorized to issue an
injunction channeling all current and future asbestos
liability against the debtor to the trust. 
1. Pre-Petition. 
a. The Impact of Co-Defendant Bankruptcies. As in
most complex Chapter 11 cases, events that precede the
filing of the bankruptcy petition play a critical role in
shaping an asbestos bankruptcy. In these cases, debtors
today most often argue that their bankruptcies are driven 
less by their relative culpability for asbestos personal 
injuries than the departure of substantially all of the first-
tier asbestos defendants from the tort system.38 These
defendants, who previously defended only a few asbestos 
cases at any given point in time, were suddenly named in
thousands of cases as other defendants filed bankruptcy and
established bankruptcy trusts.39 Thus, the bankruptcy of
past defendants has contributed to the increase in
bankruptcy filings by other defendants today, and today’s
bankruptcy filings are likely to contribute to future
35. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). 
37. See Brown, supra note 1, at 896-97. 
38. LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND INST. CIV. JUST., ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS:
AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON THE
LARGEST TRUSTS 1-3 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 RAND REPORT]. 
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bankruptcy filings by other defendants with modest roles in
the asbestos industry.40 
For example, in the Specialty Products Holding Corp.
bankruptcy, the debtors argue that they were named as de-
fendants in 107 mesothelioma cases from 1980 to 1999, with
plaintiffs receiving settlements from the debtors in just for-
ty-one of these cases.41 The debtors contend that this reflects
their actual role in the broader asbestos industry because 
they sold asbestos-containing products for a relatively brief
period (six years), and these products collectively comprised 
roughly 0.02% of the asbestos-containing products sold dur-
ing that time.42 As other defendants entered bankruptcy,
however, plaintiffs increasingly named the debtors as de-
fendants in these cases. By the time they entered bank-
ruptcy in 2010, the debtors were being named in roughly
half of all new mesothelioma cases filed in the United States
each year.43 Thus, as with their former co-defendants, these
new debtors commenced bankruptcy to obtain peace from
ongoing asbestos litigation.
b. Pre-Petition Bankruptcy Planning and Negotiations.
Once a company chooses to pursue an asbestos bankruptcy, 
it will generally take one of two tracks: a consensual filing 
or a contested filing.44 In consensual cases, the debt-
or/defendant will negotiate with one or more leading asbes-
tos plaintiffs’ lawyers and attempt to shape the basic terms
of a global bankruptcy settlement.45 Upon consultation with 
lead counsel for plaintiffs, the debtor may also select and
hire someone to serve as the legal representative for future
40. Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 525, 556 (2006) (“The sudden collapse of Owens Corning caused a 
sharp reaction on Wall Street that made capital impossible to come by for what
were now seen as ‘asbestos-tainted’ companies. This reaction, in turn, pushed
other companies over the edge. Armstrong World Industries filed for bankruptcy
protection in December 2000, followed in 2001 by G-I Holdings (GAF), USG,
W.R. Grace, Federal Mogul (Turner & Newall) and a number of less prominent
companies.”).
41. Transcript of Hearing, In re Specialty Products Holding Corp., No. 10-
11780 (JKF), at 31 (Jan. 7, 2013). 
42. Id. at 26-27. 
43. Id. at 27. 
44. 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 9-10.
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victims.46 Collectively, these parties will attempt to iron out 
a plan of action for the bankruptcy case, the basic terms of 
any resulting bankruptcy trust, and identify and resolve 
potential obstacles to establishing the trust prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case.47 By contrast, in a 
contested filing, the debtors typically file without any such
agreement or understanding and focus their energies on re-
ducing their ultimate contributions to the resulting bank-
ruptcy trust during the bankruptcy case.
2. Post-Petition Estimation and Planning. Following the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case, the United States 
Trustee ordinarily appoints an official committee of asbestos 
creditors, and the bankruptcy court appoints an official le-
gal representative for future victims.48 In consensual filings, 
the attorneys chosen for the asbestos committee may be the 
same lawyers who negotiated with the debtor pre-petition.
Likewise, debtors typically request the appointment of the 
legal representative who served in this role pre-petition,
and bankruptcy courts usually make this appointment with 
little fanfare.49 Many of the plaintiffs’ lawyers who serve on
official asbestos claimants’ committees, the lawyers who 
represent the committees, debtors’ counsel, the legal repre-
sentatives and the judge are repeat players across asbestos 
bankruptcy cases.50 Co-defendants do not typically have
standing in these cases, and their interests in preserving
current or future contribution or other rights are not ad-
vanced by the legal representative or otherwise. 51 
Once the committee and futures representative ap-
pointments are finalized, the focus of an asbestos bank-
ruptcy case is resolving the issues necessary to establish
and fund the trust. Among other things, this includes an 
estimation of the debtor’s aggregate liability to current and
46. Id. at 862. 
47. 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 9.
 48. Tung, supra note 25, at 48, 55. 
49. See Brown, supra note 1, at 897-99. 
50. For example, more than a dozen of the largest asbestos bankruptcies filed
since 2000 have been overseen by Bankruptcy Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald,
either in her home court in Pennsylvania or as a visiting judge in Delaware. 
51. In re ACandS, Inc., 462 B.R. 88 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (explaining that a

































    
   
 
548 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61
future asbestos victims, funding the trust through contribu-
tions from the debtor and other responsible parties, finaliz-
ing the trust distribution procedures and trust governance
agreements, and establishing a process for voting on the
proposed plan of reorganization.52 
Estimation—the process for determining the portion of
the estate’s assets that will be devoted to funding the 
trust—is often among the most hotly contested proceedings
in an asbestos bankruptcy. Although courts generally allow
discovery concerning a debtor’s aggregate liability,53 they
rarely allow significant inquiry into the merits of individual
asbestos claims asserted against the debtor. Under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), bankruptcy judges are not authorized 
to allow or disallow personal injury tort and wrongful death 
claims against the estate.54 This section further provides
that individual claims cannot be estimated for allowance 
purposes.55 Thus, estimation disputes tend to involve a re-
view of the debtor’s settlement history and various argu-
ments suggesting that this history may over or understate 
the debtor’s legal liability to asbestos personal injury claim-
ants.56 In most cases, estimation proceedings are valuable
more as a mechanism for encouraging the parties to reach a
consensual estimate of the debtors’ aggregate long-term as-
bestos liability than in fixing that liability directly.57 
52. Tung, supra note 25, at 55-56. 
53. Id. at 55. 
54. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (2006), bankruptcy courts may not oversee
the “liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort
or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case
under title 11.” Rather, these matters may be heard in the district court in
which the bankruptcy case is pending or in which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(5). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). 
56. See generally Philip Bentley & David Blabey Jr., Asbestos Estimation in
Today’s Bankruptcies: The Central Importance of the New Trusts, 26 MEALEY’S 
LITIG. REPT.: ASBESTOS 1 (Jan. 18, 2012). 
57. Ultimately, trust funding should be resolved by settlement regardless of
what happens at the estimation hearing. If the debtor obtains a favorable
estimation and proposes funding the trust up to—or even in excess of—this
estimated amount, the plan will still fail without the support of 75% of the 
plaintiffs. If the estimated liability is too high, the debtor may not be able to
fashion a plan that is acceptable to other creditor constituencies. Accord Frances
























   
 
   
  
   
    
 
  
 5492013] BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
During this time, the plan proponents will also finalize
negotiations concerning the contributions necessary to fund
the trust. Settlements with insurers, affiliates, and others
with potential financial responsibility for satisfying the
debtor’s liability to asbestos victims must be submitted and 
approved by the bankruptcy court.58 At the same time, cov-
erage litigation with non-settling insurers may proceed on a
parallel track in state court and, at times, continues long 
after plan confirmation.
3. Plan Confirmation. As in other aggregative proceed-
ings against a common fund, bankruptcy proceedings must
balance individual rights against collective interests. If in-
dividual creditors can block a reorganization that promises 
to increase the assets available for distribution to creditors
as a whole, opportunistic creditors may attempt to withhold
their support in order to increase their individual recover-
ies.59 This potential, in turn, may ultimately preclude the 
debtor’s restructuring as more and more individual credi-
tors seek holdout premiums for their claims.60 Conversely, 
empowering plan proponents to force individual creditors to 
accept the majority’s preference may undermine the legiti-
mate interests of individual creditors; powerful creditors
controlling large debts may skew the vote to favor certain
classes of claims and force weaker creditors to accept less
than they would receive in any liquidation of the debtor’s 
estate.61 The task for bankruptcy law and procedure is to not
only overcome the collective action problem but also provide 
for an equitable distribution to creditors according to the
value and priority of their claims.
(discussing difficulty in balancing plaintiffs’ and other creditors’ interests). In
either case, litigation over the estimate may linger on appeal and delay
confirmation to the detriment of the estate and its creditors. To that end,
although estimation may technically provide a liability figure that might be
controlling as far as plan confirmation is concerned, most of the parties
ultimately have a shared interest in settlement. 
58. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. 
59. See Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 
81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 428 (2007). 
60. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting
Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1374 (2000)
(noting that the ability to avoid the holdout problem through cramdown is a
significant benefit of the bankruptcy process). 
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Bankruptcy achieves this balance through the use of the
“cram-down” and incorporating certain claim-level protec-
tions for creditors into the plan confirmation process. Under
section 1129(b), the court can approve a plan of reorganiza-
tion notwithstanding the fact that a class of creditors rejects
the plan if the plan “does not discriminate unfairly, and is
fair and equitable” to that class of creditors. Individual
creditors are protected by provisions ensuring that they re-
ceive (a) payment in full prior to any payments to lower pri-
ority claims62 and (b) no less than the amount they would 
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the estate.63 At the 
same time, the cram-down power effectively limits a credi-
tor’s potential to obtain more than its fair share by holding 
out. 
Cram-down, however, does not apply to the supermajor-
ity vote requirement of section 524(g). If fewer than 75% of
asbestos personal injury creditors vote against the plan, the
district court is not authorized to issue an injunction chan-
neling current and future asbestos claims to the bankruptcy
trust, even if that class is subject to cram-down under sec-
tion 1129(b).64 Moreover, because asbestos personal injury
claims are controlled by a small number of influential plain-
tiffs’ law firms—any one of which may control sufficient 
votes to prevent the satisfaction of this requirement— 
section 524(g) provides a small group of lawyers with an ef-
fective veto power over any plan.65 In short, section 524(g)
undermines the Bankruptcy Code’s most effective mecha-
nism for resolving the common action problem.
To reach finality in an asbestos bankruptcy, then, 
courts and debtor-defendants rely upon this small group of
lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to obtain sufficient support amongst
their peers to satisfy the supermajority vote requirement.66 
These lead lawyers must devise trust terms that are finan-
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
64. Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.), 426
F.3d 675, 680 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Pre-packaged bankruptcies employing a
channeling injunction are not eligible for the ‘cram down’ provision contained in
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) which allows the bankruptcy court to confirm a plan of
reorganization over creditors’ objections in certain circumstances.”).
 65. Brown, supra note 1, at 860.
 66. See McGovern, supra note 57, at 247-48. 
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cially acceptable to those with strong claims, some of whom 
might have obtained high six- and seven-figure verdicts at
trial.67 At the same time, they must include generous quali-
fication criteria to obtain the support of claimants with
weak or uncertain claims—which are unlikely to be chal-
lenged due to the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)—against
the debtor. In sum, bankruptcy trusts’ criteria must be suf-
ficiently inclusive to garner the support of poorly docu-
mented claims, and the trusts’ initial payments must be 
sufficient to obtain the support of those with strong claims.68 
C. Common Features of Bankruptcy Trusts
After the plan of reorganization is confirmed and the
channeling injunction is entered, bankruptcy trusts are
organized under state law and structured as qualified
settlement funds under 26 U.S.C. § 468B. The trusts are
overseen by one or more trustees, a trust advisory
committee (TAC), and a future claimants’ representative 
(FCR).69 Trustees operate much like senior corporate
executives: hiring and overseeing employees and outside 
professionals; directing trust investments; and otherwise 
managing the day-to-day business of the trust (processing 
and paying claims).70 The TAC represents the interests of 
those with claims that have been approved by the trust but 
have not been satisfied in full, and the FCR represents the
group of unknown victims whose demands for compensation
will be advanced in the future.71 Collectively, trustees, the 
TAC, and the FCR operate much like a corporate board of
directors; periodically evaluating the trust’s overall
operations—including claim submission and payment
patterns—and making the adjustments they believe
necessary to protect the interests of trust beneficiaries.
67. See id. at 250-51. 
68. See Brown, supra note 1, at 860. 
69. See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 15; 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 
38, at 12-14.
 70. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 15; 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at
12. 
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Repeat players dominate the management roles within 
bankruptcy trusts. Trustees tend to be former plaintiffs’ 
lawyers and judges with substantial asbestos litigation or
asbestos bankruptcy experience. Likewise, FCRs tend to be
academics, lawyers and former judges with similar
expertise in these fields. One or more lawyers from just five
law firms sit on TACs for substantially all of the trusts
established since 2000, with representatives of Kazan
McClain, Baron & Budd, Motley Rice, Cooney & Conway,
and Weitz & Luxenburg on the TACs of ten or more trusts 
each.72 The influence of these firms is likely more
substantial given the presence of one or more of their
affiliate or spin-off firms on the TACs for these trusts. This
reflects both the consolidation found in asbestos personal
injury litigation generally and the fact that these same
firms tend to play substantial roles in formal and informal
asbestos plaintiffs’ committees. 
A small number of repeat players perform most of the 
claim processing across trusts. Although some bankruptcy
trusts process claims internally, most trustees employ 
experienced claims administrators to manage this process
for them. Seven claims administrators collectively manage
claim processing for the trusts controlling more than 99.7%
of the assets held in the bankruptcy trust system.73 The two
largest administrators—Verus Claims Services and 
Delaware Claims Processing Facility—manage the claim
processing for trusts responsible for more than 80% of the
payments made in 2011.74 
1. The Claim Review Process. With few exceptions, the 
process for filing, evaluating, and paying asbestos claims at
a given trust is outlined in its trust distribution procedures
(TDPs).75 Although TDPs may vary across trusts at the 
margins, most of the trusts established since the late 1990s
are based on similar templates and include many of the
same basic terms.76 Among other things, TDPs outline the
72. See 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 53-186. 
73. See Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 14, at 7. 
74. Id.
75. Although most trusts refer to this document as their “trust distribution
procedures,” other names—for example, “claim distribution procedures”—have
been used by different trusts.




























   
 




     
  
 
 5532013] BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
specific exposure and medical criteria that must be satisfied
to qualify for compensation, scheduled values for each type
of compensable disease under the TDP, the review
procedures to be employed by the claim reviewers, and the 
procedures claimants may use to appeal any adverse claim 
determinations by the reviewers.77 
To initiate claim review, the claimant’s representative
will fill out a trust claim form78 and provide any required
supporting documentation.79 Although most trusts ask for 
the same basic information, they generally require that
plaintiffs fill out unique claim forms for each trust. The
leading claim administrators, however, allow plaintiffs to
file claims against all of the trusts they service through a 
central electronic claim filing system.80 
Once submitted, trusts generally process claims on one
of two tracks: expedited review, in which the claim will be
evaluated for satisfaction of the applicable medical and
exposure criteria and paid according the scheduled value for
the asserted injury under the TDP, and individual review, 
which involves a more detailed examination of the intrinsic
merit and/or value of the claim under applicable state tort
law.81 According to the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), approximately 97 to 98% of all claims 
submitted to trusts today are processed on an expedited
review track.82 
Claims evaluated under expedited review will qualify
for payment if they satisfy the TDP requirements for
exposure and injury outlined previously. Once the trust 
concludes that a claim qualifies for payment under
expedited review, the compensation grid outlined in the
TDP will define the value of the claim. This grid identifies a
77. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 15. 
78. This form is often referred to as a “proof of claim.” The claim filed with
bankruptcy trusts, however, is distinct from the proof of claim required under
11 U.S.C. § 501 within a bankruptcy case, and the use of the term “proof of
claim” in the bankruptcy trust context has, at times, been an unnecessary
source of confusion. To that end, I refer to the claim submissions to trusts as
“claim forms.”
 79. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 17-18. 
80. Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 14, at 7. 
81. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 17-18. 
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“scheduled value” for each category of disease. These values 
are initially fixed in pre-confirmation negotiations and tend
to vary according to severity of injury. Thus, scheduled 
values for approved mesothelioma claims are consistently
higher than scheduled values for other cancer and
asbestosis claims, which have lower values in the tort
system.83 
Individual review may be mandatory or occur at the
request of the claimant.84 Some claimants may not be 
eligible for expedited review due to a documented smoking
history, failure to establish a sufficiently prolonged history
of exposure to the trust defendant’s products, or the 
inability to procure sufficient medical evidence to establish
a qualifying injury.85 In these cases, the trust is required to
deny the claim for failure to meet the presumptive exposure 
and medical standards applicable in individual review.
However, the claim may be allowed in an amount up to the
scheduled value for the asserted injury if the claim reviewer 
“is satisfied that the claimant has presented a claim that
would be cognizable and valid in the tort system.”86 
In addition, some claimants who qualify for expedited
review may nonetheless request individual review in hopes 
of obtaining more compensation for their injuries than
provided by the scheduled value for their respective
injuries.87 Individual review in this context is designed to
provide a valuation of the claim tailored to the plaintiff’s 
unique circumstances. After consideration of this
83. 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 7 n.8. Mesothelioma is a rare form
of cancer that is considered a signature disease associated with asbestos
exposure. Successful mesothelioma victims typically obtain compensation that
far exceeds that received by plaintiffs asserting other cancer and asbestosis
injuries in the tort system. Id. However, even these outcomes are not static, as
juries sometimes award large verdicts against asbestos defendants in other
cancer cases brought by long-term smokers. 
84. See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 18. 
85. 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 15. Some trusts also require 
individual review of claims based on exposure to the trust defendant’s products
outside of the United States or outside of the workplace. 
86. Combustion Engineering 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust TDP, § 2.2. Most other
trusts use the same or materially similar language. 
87. Claimants who voluntarily pursue individual review are generally
allowed to rescind the individual review election at any time prior to the
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information, the trust may offer compensation that is less
than, equal to, or greater than the scheduled value of the
claim up to the maximum amount authorized for that 
disease category under the TDP.88 Claim-level data is not
generally disclosed by the trusts, so an empirical analysis of 
how claimants seeking enhanced recoveries fare under
individual review is not currently possible. 
2. Settlement Offers and Payments. Once the claim
administrator approves and assigns a value to a claim, the
trust will make an offer to the claimant. If the claimant 
accepts the offer, payments tend to be made quickly. If the
claimant rejects the offer, the claimant and the trust may 
negotiate or engage in some form of alternative dispute 
resolution procedure as outlined by the trust.89 If this fails, 
the trust distribution procedures may allow for the claimant 
to pursue claim valuation in the tort system.90 
To slow the depletion of trust assets, TDPs authorize 
(and frequently require) trust officials to periodically revisit 
future claim submission and payment projections and adopt
a “payment percentage” to equalize payments going
forward.91 When a trust adopts a payment percentage that 
is less than 100%, every claim that is settled by the trust
going forward will be paid an amount equal to the settled 
value times the payment percentage immediately. The
claimant will retain a claim for the unpaid portion, which 
may result in additional payments only if the trust’s
payment percentage increases in the future. Given the 
historical patterns, however, it is unlikely that these future
payments will be substantial. 
88. 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 21, For example, under section 
5.3(b)(3) of the United States Gypsum Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement
Trust TDP, the scheduled value for a mesothelioma claim is $155,000, and the
maximum value a mesothelioma claimant can be awarded after individual
review is $450,000. 
89. 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 21. 
90. Id.
91. Some trusts adopt and apply a payment percentage from the outset when
projected current and future liabilities exceed the trusts projected assets. For 
example, the recently established Christy Refractories Co. Asbestos Personal
Injury Trust applies a payment percentage of 11%. Christy Refractories
Asbestos Personal Injury Trust TDP, § 2.3. Trusts may also employ other
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Under the T H Agriculture & Nutrition Personal Injury
Trust (THAN Trust) TDP, for example, an approved 
mesothelioma claim has a scheduled settlement value of 
$150,000.92 The THAN Trust has a payment percentage of 
30%,93 however, so the amount paid for a mesothelioma 
claim approved today would be $45,000 ($150,000 x .3). If 
the trust increases the payment percentage to 35% in the
future, the claimant would be entitled to an additional 5% of
the scheduled value at that time, or $7500 ($150,000 x .05). 
If the payment age declines further, the claimant will not
have to return any money received, but she will not receive 
any additional recovery unless and until the payment 
percentage is subsequently increased to more than 30%.  
II. ANALYSIS: TRUST CRITERIA AND QUALITY CONTROLS 
With the codification of the bankruptcy trust model in 
section 524(g), the focus of asbestos bankruptcy shifted from
advancing its equitable and constitutional foundations to 
shaping the accepted interpretations of the statutory 
language to expedite the process.94 Most of the unique issues
that arise in an asbestos bankruptcy as a result of section 
524(g)—the standards for appointing a legal representative
for future victims,95 whether an injunction is fair and 
equitable among injunction beneficiaries and victims,96 and
whether current and future victims stand to receive 
substantially similar treatment97—are left to the discretion 
of the judges overseeing the case. And if a current party in
interest does not raise these issues, they may be considered 
only in passing. By contrast, the supermajority vote
requirement leaves little room for discretion: either the plan 
has the support of at least 75% of asbestos claimants or it
does not. And to facilitate expeditious case administration,
92. T H Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC Asbestos Personal Injury Trust TDP, §
5.3(a)(3).
93. T H Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC Asbestos Personal Injury Trust
Payment Percentage Notice (Mar. 21, 2011) [on file with author]. 
94. See Brown, supra note 1, at 896. 
95. See NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS,
FINAL REPORT 331-32 (1997) (noting lack of guidance in the Bankruptcy Code 
concerning appointments of legal representatives for future claimants). 
96. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (2006). 
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much of what occurs in an asbestos bankruptcy centers
around ensuring that this condition can be met in a timely
fashion.98 
The irony of section 524(g) is how this mechanism for 
protecting future victims—requiring the approval of a su-
permajority of current asbestos creditors—also empowers 
current claimants to shape bankruptcy trusts in ways that
ultimately undermine future victims’ prospects for recovery.
On the surface, section 524(g)’s protections for future vic-
tims should limit front-loading payments to current claim-
ants, but obtaining the support of current claimants fre-
quently entails marginalizing other voices in the bank-
ruptcy case and the resulting trusts. These attorneys who 
can deliver sufficient votes to satisfy the supermajority vote 
requirement exercise considerable control over the design of
the trust, appointments to leadership roles within the trust, 
and the distribution procedures that define the process for
reviewing and paying claims.99 This control over appoint-
ments has a clear punch-pulling effect during the bank-
ruptcy case,100 and trustees and claims administrators are 
bound to process and value claims according the terms of 
the TDPs that are largely dictated by the asbestos commit-
tee. 
Although affording a relatively small group of lawyers
the power to exercise considerable control over the process
may give courts and others pause, it does not necessarily
follow that this authority has been abused. Indeed, some
trusts have become more restrictive in their injury stan-
dards and payments to unimpaired claims in recent years,101 
and other recent developments may suggest that some
trusts have become more vigilant in testing the intrinsic
merit of the claims submitted.102 Even with these changes, 
98. See Brown, supra note 1, at 860-61. 
99. See id. at 862-63. 
100. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 177 
(2007). 
101. Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust
Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 164 (2006). 
102. In September 2012, for example, trusts managed by the Western Asbestos
Settlement Trust sued a law firm that specializes in filing asbestos claims with
bankruptcy trusts, alleging that the firm “engaged in a pattern of submitting
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however, critics continue to stress that bankruptcy trusts
have become a haven for fraudulent claims.103 
A. Study Parameters 
Although the manner in which bankruptcy trusts are
established suggests the potential for corrupting their 
statutory purpose, studies to date have not provided a
meaningful picture of the effect on the trusts operations. 
Other attempts to study bankruptcy trusts suggest that this
is due to the growing secrecy surrounding their
operations.104 Some trusts previously sold or licensed their
claim information freely,105 but most bankruptcy trusts
currently treat claim submissions and payments as
confidential.106 Beginning in 2006, new trusts included TDP
language requiring the trusts to treat claim submissions, 
discussions and payments as confidential “settlement
negotiations,” and several older trusts amended their TDPs
to include similar provisions.107 These provisions obligate
trustees to “take all necessary and appropriate steps” to
resist disclosure of this information unless authorized by
the claimant or required under applicable law.108 As a result,
during the timeframe that the trust system emerged as
significant source of plaintiff compensation, substantially 
all of the trusts became more secretive concerning the 
claim-level information necessary to study their operations
in detail. 
the [trusts].” Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 2, W. Asbestos Settlement
Trust v. Mandelbrot, No. 12-04190 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). 
103. See, e.g., Editorial, Busting the Trust Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2012, at
A18; Daniel Fisher, Double-Dippers, FORBES, Sept. 4, 2006, at 136 (“Even as
states crack down on frivolous lawsuits by people with no symptoms at all,
trusts established by bankrupt asbestos manufacturers are paying tens of
thousands of claims each year based on inflated or downright false stories of
how people were exposed to their products.”).
 104. See LLOYD DIXON & GEOFFREY MCGOVERN, RAND INST. CIV. JUST.,
ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS AND TORT COMPENSATION xi (2011) [hereinafter
2011 RAND REPORT]. 
105. H.R. REP. NO. 112-687, at 11 (2012) [hereinafter the FACT ACT REPORT]. 
106. See 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at xvii. 
107. Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 14, at 9. 
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Notwithstanding these limitations, most active bank-
ruptcy trusts’ TDPs and financial reports remain public in-
formation.109 Using the TDPs, it is possible to identify the
extent to which trust criteria expand the pool of com-
pensable claims beyond comparable standards in the tort
system. Moreover, by comparing trust standards and prac-
tices against complex global settlements in which plaintiffs 
do not enjoy similar dominance over the process, it is also
possible to highlight weaknesses in trust design that may be
attributable to the leverage imbalance created by section 
524(g). 
Specifically, this analysis focuses on the publicly avail-
able information from thirty-two trusts. This sample ex-
cludes inactive trusts, including trusts that only rarely ac-
cept and pay claims, and those whose long-term prospects
hinge upon unresolved litigation. This exclusion is neces-
sary to avoid injecting data that might suggest unrepresen-
tative patterns, practices, and financial information. More-
over, many of these excluded trusts do not provide sufficient
public disclosures to allow a meaningful study of their op-
erations. Finally, given that the focus of this review is the
long-term performance of active trusts, this sample excludes 
trusts that have not yet become active and any trusts that 
were only recently approved, except as otherwise noted.
The trusts’ exposure and medical criteria are compared
to representative standards in the tort system and similarly 
complex global settlements to the extent outlined below. 
These comparisons are not intended to suggest that any dis-
connect from applicable tort law is necessarily undesirable;
indeed, any administrative claims resolution process is like-
ly to adopt criteria that are more streamlined than state
tort litigation.110 Moreover, given the differences in the
standards from one state to the next and changes in state
law over time, it may be impractical to establish stream-
lined compensation criteria that track tort standards to
each individual claim. Where noted, this section also con-
trasts bankruptcy trust TDPs against the terms of the
global settlements adopted in the National Settlement Plan 
in the Fen-Phen litigation, the Vioxx multidistrict litigation
(MDL), and the Gulf Oil Spill MDL. These non-bankruptcy 
109. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 16. 
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settlements were selected because they involve similarly
complex evidentiary and oversight questions and employ 
comparable grid/matrix procedures for evaluating and valu-
ing claims for settlement.  
B. A Comparative Analysis of Trust Criteria 
As noted in Part I, claimants must satisfy a trust’s ex-
posure and injury criteria to qualify for payment. For the 97 
to 98% of claims that are subject to expedited review,111 a 
causal connection between the two may be assumed if these 
two criteria are satisfied. Likewise, other potential de-
fenses—including submission of a claim after the applicable
limitations period has expired and alternate causation (such 
as far higher exposure to other asbestos products, smoking
history, etc.)—may not be available or will be evaluated
solely on the basis of the claimants’ representations to the 
trust. The trusts’ exposure, medical and quality control pro-
visions are discussed in greater detail below. 
1. Exposure Standards. Interestingly, some of the 
strongest criticism of TDP exposure standards comes from
prominent plaintiffs’ lawyers, including some whose firms
have played a critical role in designing several trusts. These 
challenges typically arise when defendants in the tort sys-
tem attempt to avoid or reduce their liability to the plaintiff 
by arguing that his or her disease should be attributed, in
whole or in part, to products manufactured by entities
whose liabilities have been assumed by bankruptcy trusts.
For example, in a recent state court filing, three leading
plaintiffs’ firms observed: 
Many of the asbestos bankruptcy trusts do not require proof of
exposure to a company’s products. Rather, some trusts base their
offer on medical diagnosis alone, while others care about an
individual’s occupation or job location. None of the trusts require
the standard of proof that is used by a court in a civil trial.112 
Another prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer recently opined
that the use of approved job site lists allows individuals who
111. See GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 20.  
112. Plaintiff’s Joint Motion for a Protective Order Regarding Settlements and
Bankruptcy Claims at 2, In re Asbestos Litig., No. 96-9999 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 12,
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worked “three buildings over” from any asbestos to qualify
for payment.113 
A survey of the active trusts’ TDPs largely confirms
these assessments.114 Section 5.7(b)(2) of the Combustion 
Engineering (CE) Trust, for example, provides that a
claimant must have at least five years of occupational
exposure to asbestos fibers or regular contact with others 
who were regularly exposed to asbestos, but may require no
more than one fleeting exposure to a product with virtually 
any relationship to the trust’s predecessor.115 Mesothelioma 
claimants, for example, need only demonstrate exposure to
“an asbestos-containing product sold, distributed, marketed,
supplied, specified, produced, selected, maintained,
handled, processed, installed, repaired or manufactured by
CE or for which CE otherwise has legal responsibility.”116 
For all other injury categories, the claimant must establish
that this exposure occurred for no less than six months.117 
Twenty-four of the trusts surveyed employ identical ex-
posure criteria.118 Only three trusts have express minimum 
temporal exposure requirements for mesothelioma claims.119 
Eighteen have no minimum exposure periods for Level 1 
non-malignant claims and require no more than six months
113. See Symposium, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts and Their Impact on the 
Tort System, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 281, 297 (2010) (comments of Nathan Finch)
(“A lot of bankruptcy trusts, particularly the newer ones for mesothelioma
claims, all they say that there has to be meaningful and credible evidence of
exposure; but that can be just a site list. That can be working at a site where 
somebody is; it could be the equivalent of the guy who was at the place where
the auto parts were three buildings over. I would argue that doesn’t prove
causation, and while that may be admissible to prove something, it’s not the
same thing as the type of proof that would get you to a jury, or get you past a
directed verdict motion on the defense’s cross claim against another 
defendant.”). 
114. See infra Appendix B (Exposure and Medical Criteria). 
115. Combustion Engineering 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust TDP, § 5.7(b)(2).
 116. Id. at § 5.7(b)(3). 
117. Id. at § 5.7(b)(1). 
118. See infra Appendix B (Exposure and Medical Criteria). 
119. Two of these trusts require three months exposure to the predecessor’s
products for mesothelioma claims and one year of exposure for all other claims.
Western Asbestos Settlement Trust Case Valuation Matrix, § VII.c.; J.T. Thorpe
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of exposure to the predecessor’s products or others who
worked with those products for all other claims.120 Moreover,
twenty-one of the trusts studied have published “approved
work site” and similar lists of locations or ships where their 
predecessor companies’ products were located, so claimants
can more readily establish qualifying exposure by demon-
strating that they worked at one of these approved sites.121 
Collectively, this suggests that it is possible for a claim-
ant who did not work directly with or even in the same
building as an asbestos-containing product to nonetheless
qualify as exposed. For the highest value claims (meso-
thelioma) and the numerous low-value non-malignant
claims, even an isolated, passing “exposure” may be suffi-
cient to qualify for payment. Indeed, it is not clear how this
language would disqualify those whose sole basis for claim-
ing exposure is an isolated walk across a clean, unbroken 
asbestos-containing tile floor or a brief conversation with
someone who might have worked in proximity to such tiles
“three buildings over.”122 For all other claims, six months at
an approved job site or work around those who might have
worked with asbestos-containing products may be sufficient 
for the trusts’ purposes, regardless of the claimant’s actual
degree of exposure to airborne asbestos fibers. 
In addition, fourteen of the trusts include language that
expressly authorizes claimants to assert exposure histories 
that are inconsistent with representations made in the tort 
system.123 Specifically, these provisions state that evidence
submitted in support of trust claims “is for the sole benefit
of the trust, not third parties or defendants who remain in
the tort system,”124 and further note that:
120. See infra Appendix B. Several trusts also have no minimum requirement
for Level 1 Cancer Claims, but most of these trusts treat this class of claims as
requiring individual review. This category typically includes cancer claims that
do not satisfy other cancer claim category criteria, including claims submitted 
by those with disqualifying smoking histories. 
121. See id.
 122. Symposium, supra note 113, at 287. 
123. See infra Appendix B. 
124. This language is taken from the Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corporation Asbestos Personal Injury Trust TDP, § 5.7(b)(3), and is materially
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The [trust] has no need for, and therefore claimants are not 
required to furnish the [trust] with evidence of exposure to specific
asbestos products other than those for which [the trust] has legal
responsibility. . . . Similarly, failure to identify [the trust
defendant’s] products in the claimant’s underlying tort action, or
to other bankruptcy trusts, does not preclude the claimant from 
recovering from the [trust], provided the claimant otherwise
satisfies the medical and exposure requirements of the Asbestos
TDP.125 
Given the limited information required in the trusts’ 
claim forms, even the claimant’s submission of conflicting 
work histories with different trusts126 and sworn denials of
exposure to the trust predecessor’s products in the tort 
system are unlikely to draw scrutiny.127 
This exposure standard is considerably less demanding
than those found in the tort systems in most states, many of
which have expressly rejected similarly expansive theories
of causation in asbestos litigation.128 The commonly applied
“frequency, regularity and proximity” test articulated in
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., for example, 
assumes that a reasonable inference of substantial
causation requires “evidence of exposure to a specific
product on a regular basis over some extended period of
time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.”129 
125. Id. 
126. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 23 (“Although the possibility exists that a 
claimant could file the same medical evidence and altered work histories with
different trusts, each trust’s focus is to ensure that each claim meets the criteria
defined in its TDP, meaning the claimant has met the requisite medical and
exposure histories to the satisfaction of the trustees.”). 
127. Less than half of the trusts involved in the GAO Report advised that they
track public information and court filings. Id. at 21. 
128. See David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74
BROOK. L. REV. 51, 59 (2008) (“The recent, increasingly strict exposure cases . . .
reflect a welcome realization by state courts that holding defendants liable for
causing asbestos-related disease when their products were responsible for only
de minimis exposure to asbestos, and other parties were responsible for far
greater exposure, is not just, equitable, or consistent with the substantial factor
requirements of the Restatement (Second) and Lohrmann.”). 
129. 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986). This test is the most frequently
cited standard for establishing substantial causation. Charles T. Greene,
Determining Liability in Asbestos Cases: The Battle to Assign Liability Decades
After Exposure, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 571, 572 (2008) (noting that a majority of
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It is not sufficient, however, to produce evidence that a 
company’s product was present at the workplace; mere 
exposure to a product without evidence demonstrating 
evidence to airborne asbestos fibers over a reasonable 
period of time is generally not enough to support a 
reasonable inference of causation.130 Although the plaintiff is 
not required to prove that asbestos fibers from the
defendant’s products “actually began the process of
malignant cellular growth,” this standard most often
requires a “reasonable medical probability” that it was “a
substantial factor” contributing to the risk of developing the
disease,131 and “single exposure” or “each and every breath” 
theories generally do not provide a sufficient basis for 
causation.132 
130. See Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162-63; see also Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. 
Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] mere showing that defendant’s 
product was present somewhere at plaintiff’s place of work is insufficient” to
establish causation); Peerman v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 35 F.3d 284, 287 (7th
Cir. 1994) (“Although under the ‘job site’ test or any similar test for causation a
plaintiff need not produce evidence of actual exposure to the product that is
alleged to have caused an asbestos-related disease, a plaintiff still must produce
evidence sufficient to support an inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from
the defendant’s product. Of course, this inference can be made only if it is shown
that the defendant’s product, as it was used during the plaintiff’s tenure at the 
job site, could possibly have produced a significant amount of asbestos dust and
that the asbestos dust might have been inhaled by the plaintiff.”); Menne v. 
Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1461-62, n.12 (10th Cir.1988) (concluding that the
mere presence of a defendant’s asbestos-containing product at the plaintiff’s
work site is insufficient to establish causation and characterizing cases
concluding otherwise as “extremely attenuated”); Kraus v. Celotex Corp., 925 F.
Supp. 646, 653 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (“Plaintiffs’ evidence that AWI’s products were
used at the Kincaid Powerhouse job does not support a reasonable inference
that Mr. Kraus was exposed to asbestos from those products, much less that
AWI products caused his injuries and death. Because plaintiffs have not set 
forth specific facts which raise an issue of material fact for trial, defendant
AWI’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.”); Henderson v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 724, 727 (S.C. 2007) (quoting Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at
1162). But see Lockwood v. AC&S, Inc., 722 P.2d 826, 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986),
aff’d en banc 744 P.2d 605 (Wash. 1987). 
131. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1206, 1223 (Cal. 1997). 
132. Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elect. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that such theories “would render the substantial cause requirement
‘meaningless’”); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480,
1482-83 (11th Cir. 1985); Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1171-72
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In states that allow single exposure theories to get to a
jury, the evidence submitted to satisfy these standards with
a trust is unlikely to be subjected to adversarial scrutiny 
comparable to that found in the tort system. Even in these
states, juries are free to discount expert opinions as
speculative and insufficient to establish causation, and this
is likely where causation requires an extreme leap of faith133 
or other potential causes are more readily established. And
given the extent to which jury assessments of causation and
the allocation of fault in asbestos personal injury cases often 
hinges upon relative exposures to the defendants’ products;
a reasonable jury seems unlikely to consider an isolated 
exposure to an undisturbed product containing 
encapsulated asbestos a substantial cause of the plaintiff’s 
disease where the plaintiff had long-term, direct exposure to
airborne asbestos from other sources. Yet the trusts’ criteria
treat a single or otherwise very limited exposure to a 
product or site as equivalent to long-term, direct exposure to
airborne asbestos fibers. Thus, these common trust 
exposure criteria appear to be over-inclusive and to over-
compensate weak claims, at least when compared to state 
law tort systems.  
The fact that the trusts employ standards that are less 
exacting than the tort system is unsurprising, but the divide
between the two systems is nonetheless remarkable. In 
designing trusts to minimize subjective considerations and 
reduce the time required to process claims, prevailing
exposure standards strip a critical common sense
component in evaluating individual claims. Some level of 
departure from the level of scrutiny possible in the tort 
system may be necessary to advance the objective of prompt 
causation); Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts Co., 943 A.2d 216, 226 (Pa. 2007) (“[A]ny
exposure” expert opinions “do not suffice to create a jury question in a case
where exposure to the defendant’s product is de minimis, particularly in the
absence of evidence excluding other possible sources of exposure (or in the face 
of evidence of substantial exposure from other sources).”). As one commentator
recently observed, “the ‘any exposure’ theory is failing across the spectrum of
asbestos cases, regardless of disease and type of exposure.” Mark A. Behrens,
What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 531 (2009). 
133. See, e.g., Weakley v. Burnham Corp., 871 A.2d 1167, 1175-76 (D.C. 2005) 
(concluding that the causation premised upon “every exposure” testimony
should be submitted to the trier of fact but expressing doubt that the fact-finder
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recovery for victims.134 Nonetheless, these standards may be
fairly read to embrace causation frameworks that have been 
expressly rejected by several state courts, preclude
consideration of evidence that may undermine causation
entirely, and otherwise afford claim reviewers insufficient 
leeway to reject claims that appear unlikely to survive early
dispositive motions at trial under applicable state law.135 
2. Medical Criteria. The medical criteria employed by
bankruptcy trusts have tightened gradually over time.
Many trusts today require some evidence of exposure as a
contributing cause to the asserted injury, and “there has
been an increasing tendency to require more and more
rigorous tests and diagnoses.”136 Asbestos-related cancer
diagnoses must be based on either a physical examination 
conducted by the diagnosing physician or a pathology
report.137 Newer trusts may also require the submission of
additional supporting medical evidence, including X-rays,
CT scans, detailed pulmonary function test results, 
laboratory tests, tissue samples, and evidence that the
medical evidence submitted is based on equipment, testing
methods and procedures that comply with recognized 
medical standards.138 Several trusts have also adopted 
provisions clarifying that a physician’s finding “that a 
claimant’s disease is ‘consistent with’ or ‘compatible with’ 
134. See NAGAREDA, supra note 100, at 150 (“The problem of overclaiming
inheres in any move from a tort system predicated on individualized proof
toward a streamlined administrative regime. Efficient application of a
compensation grid necessarily involves cutting corners by comparison to the 
detailed proof that might be demanded in tort litigation.”); Deborah R. Hensler,
Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other 
Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 188 (2001)
(“[T]housands of lesser-value claims may be resolved en masse according to
negotiated schedules of damages that pay little attention to individual claim
differences and involve little adversarial litigation.”). 
135. See S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlements, 42 U. MEM.
L. REV. 559, 572 (2012) [hereinafter Brown, Specious Claims] (noting that
bankruptcy trust claim processing “neither resembles the traditional adversary
process nor compensates for the policing functions of adversary litigation that
have been stripped away”). 
136. McGovern, supra note 101, at 172. 
137. Id.
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asbestosis shall not alone be treated by the Trust as a 
diagnosis.”139 
Notwithstanding these changes, establishing a
compensable injury remains considerably less demanding 
than in the tort system. As with juries in the tort system, 
trust claim reviewers typically defer to the expertise of 
medical professionals in determining whether a plaintiff has 
a compensable injury if the diagnosis otherwise complies 
with trust criteria. The primary difference between the
trusts’ administrative claim review and the tort system,
however, is that defendants in tort litigation most often hire
and rely upon the advice and testimony of their own medical 
experts when evaluating the plaintiff’s claim. By contrast,
trusts do not hire independent medical experts for the
purpose of testing the veracity of medical evidence, and few
appear to consult independent medical experts even in
connection with audited claims.140 This sole reliance on the 
opinion of a single medical professional selected by the
claimant or claimant’s counsel risks supplanting the search
for the truth of the claimant’s injury with a search for a 
doctor who is willing to provide a favorable report.141 
In addition, trusts rely extensively on plaintiffs’
willingness to make admissions that may be against their
interests on claim forms, and claim reviewers may have
little opportunity to challenge these admissions. For 
example, a claim submitted by a smoker is not eligible for
compensation under expedited review at several trusts, but 
this information will become available to the trust only if
the claimant admits to a smoking history on the claim form. 
In practice, some plaintiffs firms may not inquire about or
verify clients’ smoking histories before submitting claim
forms indicating that they were non-smokers,142 and 
139. Id. at § 5.7(a)(1). 
140. Of the trusts interviewed by the GAO, only one advised that it sends
medical records to an independent doctor, and that was only with respect to 
claims selected for audit. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 23. 
141. See Rohan Price, The Need for a Regulatory Response to Diagnosis Fraud
in Mesothelioma Cases, 19 AUSTRALIAN J. L. & MED. 196, 198-200 (2011)
(discussing the United States experience with asbestos diagnosis fraud and
outlining similar concerns in Australia).  
142. See Transcript of Deposition of David Thomas Robeson, Sr. at 9, 20, 23-
24, 47-48, 61, 67, 80, 63-84, Robeson v. Ametek, No. 2004-15722 (La. Dist. Ct. 
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claimants have a clear incentive to conceal this information
when the likelihood of any additional inquiry is low.
Nonetheless, the extent to which this opportunity to 
transform lower value smoking claims into higher value
non-smoking claims has been exploited is impossible to
quantify given the limited claim-level information currently 
available.
Standing alone, a straightforward comparison of the
trusts’ approach to establishing qualifying injuries to the 
tort system does not provide a compelling critique of the
trust system. Any administrative scheme must balance the 
costs of testing the veracity of the medical evidence 
submitted against the risk that some of the medical
evidence submitted is manufactured or otherwise 
unreliable. The present record is sparse concerning the 
actual costs of more searching examinations of the medical 
evidence or requiring more objective testing. To date, trusts
appear to operate on the assumption that they cannot
match or approach the potential of the tort system for
identifying and deterring specious claims without also 
incurring the high transaction costs associated with 
asbestos litigation.
3. Audits and Adaptability. The difficulty in balancing 
the need to test intrinsic merit against the costs of doing so
is common across global settlements and compensation 
funds involving mass tort claims.143 To that end, a stronger
test of the impact of the power imbalance created by section 
524(g) on bankruptcy trusts is to contrast the trusts’ 
mechanisms for testing the veracity of claimants’ 
representations against similar mechanisms in other global
settlement plans that are established in other forums. Such
comparisons are imperfect given the differences in the 
injuries involved, the state of the scientific understanding of
these injuries, and the degree to which asbestos plaintiff
and defendant elasticity may alter litigant behavior in
fashioning settlement terms. Moreover, some of these 
settlements may also have the luxury of relying on
governmental authorities to investigate suspected fraud or
father was a smoker and advising that counsel never consulted with his father
or others concerning smoking status).  
143. See Ian Ayres, Optimal Pooling in Claim Resolution Facilities, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 160 (1990) (discussing litigation costs associated with
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funding from third parties that are not currently available
to bankruptcy trusts. Finally, there are few global
settlements that match the claim volume and assets
distributed by bankruptcy trusts, so it is difficult to build a
statistically significant sample for comparison. Nonetheless,
contrasting bankruptcy trusts’ approach to auditing
individual claims with similar provisions in other global 
settlements may reveal additional opportunities for trusts 
to bridge the gap with evidentiary testing in the tort system 
without unduly draining scarce trust assets. 
In other global settlements that follow similar adminis-
trative claim review and payment models, settlement ad-
ministrators typically attempt to identify and deter fraudu-
lent patterns and practices through the use of a robust 
claim audit process. As Kenneth Feinberg recently ob-
served, “anytime you establish a very generous public com-
pensation program, it will trigger a certain amount of
fraudulent activity.”144 Every major claims resolution facility 
in recent history—including state-level workers compensa-
tion programs, the Black Lung Fund,145 the Katrina and
Rita hurricane disaster relief programs,146 the 9/11 Victims 
Compensation Fund,147 and the Gulf Coast Claims Facil-
ity,148 to name but a few—have experienced fraudulent claim 
submissions. Moreover, this history demonstrates that some
repeat players will adopt patterns and practices that exploit
144. Jay Weaver, Fraud Pollutes BP Oil-Spill Compensation Fund for Gulf 
Coast Victims from Florida to Louisiana, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/19/2959468/fraud-pollutes-bp-
oil-spill-compensation.html (quoting Kenneth Feinberg). 
145. Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program:
Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665, 734 (1989). 
146. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DISASTER FRAUD TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at i (“Through the end of Fiscal Year
2011, 47 United States Attorney’s Offices across the country charged 1,439
people in 1,350 cases with various fraud-related crimes stemming just from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.”).
 147. See, e.g., Bruce Golding, $3M Slap for 9/11-fund Scammer, N.Y. POST, 
Sept. 15, 2011, at 8; Nedra Pickler, Retired Cmdr. Sentenced for 9/11-related
Fraud, NAVY TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.navytimes.com/article/20111212/NEWS/112120314/Retired-cmdr-
sentenced-for-9-11-related-fraud.  
148. See, e.g., John Swartz, BP Fund Is a Magnet for Fraud, Experts Say, N.Y.
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weaknesses in comprehensive settlement or public compen-
sation plans that allow them to obtain compensation for 
claims that satisfy settlement criteria but nonetheless lack 
intrinsic merit.149 
Asbestos litigation and bankruptcy trusts specifically
have a long history with specious and manufactured
claims.150 The specious claim development practices identi-
fied and discredited in the Silica MDL151 generated asbestos
claims that dominated asbestos litigation, settlement, and
bankruptcy trust submissions for more than a decade. The
frequently cited Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. case in-
volved factual representations to certain trusts that, accord-
ing to the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s private communications with
his partners, were effectively manufactured from whole 
cloth.152 Other recent cases suggest that some firms submit
trust claims based on affidavits from family members and
others who are unlikely to have the personal knowledge of 
the facts asserted153 and work and medical evidence that is
inconsistent with sworn testimony in other proceedings.154 
149. See Brown, Specious Claims, supra note 135, at 561. 
150. Id. at 572-79.  
151. Id. at 579-83. 
152. No. CV 442750, at 6 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Jan. 18, 2007). In this case,
the plaintiff’s claim form submitted to the Manville Trust represented that he
was a shipyard laborer who worked with certain specified Johns-Manville
products. Id. at 5. Mr. Kananian, however, was not a shipyard laborer—he was
at the shipyard “one day to pick up his ship”—and there was “no evidence that
[he] ever worked with these products.” Id. at 5-6. As the court concluded, “[t]his
fiction, of course, improved chances of recovery from the trust, but was not
based on Mr. Kananian’s work history, client interview(s), or deposition.” Id. at
9-10. The claim was processed and paid. 
153. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 7, W. Asbestos Settlement
Trust v. Mandelbrot, No. 02-46284 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). 
154. Id.; How Fraud and Abuse in the Asbestos Compensation System Affect
Victims, Jobs, the Economy, and the Legal System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112 Cong. 103-
04 (2011) (written Statement of James L. Stengel, Esq.) (discussing cases
litigated in Baltimore); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Chrysler
LLC’s Motion for Leave to Renew, D’Ulisse v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No.  
113838/04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2008) (alleging that plaintiff denied exposure
to trust defendants’ products under oath in state court and filed claim forms
alleging exposure to same products under penalty of perjury with trusts); 
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Notwithstanding this history, the audit provisions at
many bankruptcy trusts appear to be more of an after-
thought than a vital component of preserving trust assets. 
Of the trusts included in this study, only four provide for 
mandatory audits, and twenty-four require the advance 
consent of the TAC before any new audit plan may be
adopted.155 Two of the distribution procedures reviewed in-
cluded provisions authorizing insurers to request audits.156 
Although eight trusts authorize open-ended audits without 
expressly requiring TAC approval, only two of the trusts
surveyed by the GAO in connection with its 2011 report on 
bankruptcy trusts used random and targeted sampling of 
claims.157 Indeed, given the history of asbestos litigation and
global compensation systems generally, the trusts’ repre-
sentations to the GAO that they have uncovered no fraud158 
are more suggestive of weaknesses in their internal controls
than evidence that the trust system has managed to avoid 
fraud and abuse. 
By contrast, other recent global settlements have con-
sistently included aggressive, independent mechanisms for 
auditing claims and seeking civil and criminal sanctions
where fraudulent and specious claims are uncovered. The 
Fen-Phen national settlement, for example, initially pro-
vided for mandatory audits of 15% of the claims submitted
and provided for severe penalties against the law firms, doc-
tors and claimants who submitted claims that lacked a le-
(Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2003) (identifying numerous conflicting representations
under oath in state court proceedings and bankruptcy trust claim forms). 
155. See infra Appendix C (Audit Provisions). 
156. Once insurers settle with bankruptcy trusts, however, they have little
interest in how trust proceeds are distributed. Their primary interest at this
stage is to obtain information that may improve their defenses and offset
potential in state court proceedings involving the same claims, but their efforts 
to use any negotiated audit rights for such purposes have not been successful.
See Renfrew v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 406 F. App’x 227 (9th Cir.
2010). 
157. GAO REPORT, supra note 13, at 23. For a discussion of the need for
random and targeted audits in global settlements, see Brown, Specious Claims, 
supra note 135, at 619-23. 
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gitimate medical foundation.159 Similarly, the Vioxx Master 
Settlement Agreement provided for mandatory audits of be-
tween 2.0% and 5.0% of all claims submitted,160 allowed for 
targeted audits with respect to repeat players with a history
suggestive of fraudulent or specious submissions,161 author-
ized the defendant to conduct its own audits in its sole dis-
cretion and at its own expense,162 and included several pro-
visions for pursuing civil and criminal actions against those 
submitting fraudulent claims.163 The recent medical class 
action settlement in the Deepwater Horizon litigation also
includes mandatory audits of five percent of all claims 
paid,164 requires the submission of additional supporting
documentation for all audited claims,165 authorizes targeted
audits of claims based on indicia of potential abuse,166 and 
provides for potential civil and criminal penalties for those 
submitting misleading or fraudulent claims.167 
Audit plans are tailored to the nature of the settlement 
and the claims being reviewed,168 and their design typically
reflects a rational balancing of the costs and benefits of au-
diting claims. Where defendants must bear the costs of pay-
ing specious claims out of their own pockets, the experience
in other global settlements suggests that they consistently
accept the costs of mandatory, targeted audits to identify 
and deter these claims because, on balance, such audit costs
reduce the total cost of the settlement. With the defendants’
risk capped by section 524(g), however, defendants and 
159. Nationwide Class Action Settlement with American Home Prods. Corp. 
(as amended) § VI(E)(1), Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 99-20593 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 18, 1999). 
160. Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and Counsel § 10.2.1
(Nov. 9, 2007). 
161. Id. § 10.2.2. 
162. Id. § 10.3.1. 
163. See id. §§ 10.1.3, 10.4.  
164. Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement
(as amended) § XXI(G)(1), Plaisance v. BP Exploration & Prod., No. 12-CV-28
(May 1, 2012). 
165. Id. § XXI(G)(2)-(3). 
166. Id. § XXI(G)(4).
 167. See id. §§ XXI(G)(9), (H).  
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trust fiduciaries have not demanded comparable claim audit
procedures across bankruptcy trusts. The primary differ-
ence appears to be that the parties who will bear the costs of
rampant overpayment to current bankruptcy trust claim-
ants—future victims—are not able to speak for themselves, 
and those who are appointed to speak for them lack suffi-
cient leverage and, perhaps, the will to demand comparable 
protections.
Even those trust fiduciaries who favor more aggressive 
audits must take into account potential internal challenges
from TAC members and potential litigation with other 
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Here, the Manville Trust’s efforts to
employ an aggressive claim audit program in the late 1990s
serves more as a cautionary tale for trust officials than a 
warning for those who advance dubious claims. The trust’s 
initial audit was designed “in favor of confirming the dis-
ease documented by the claimant and to give the benefit of 
any doubt to the claimant.”169 Even under this approach,
this initial audit suggested that 41% of the claimants had
no disease or a less severe condition than claimed, and the 
doctors most often used by plaintiffs had an average failure
rate of 63%.170 The trust then sought to expand the audit, 
but it was challenged by the affected law firms, and drew
criticism from the presiding judge, who, among other things,
stated that “the Trust had no business medically auditing
claims (regardless of any authority to do so in the Trust
documents).”171 And though the judge ultimately reversed 
course following dramatic reductions in the Manville pay-
ment percentage in subsequent years,172 and many of the
Manville Trusts’ apparent concerns about claim quality
were arguably verified in the Silica MDL,173 no bankruptcy
trust has proposed similarly aggressive audits in the time 
since. 
169. Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation:
The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 131 (2003)
(internal citation omitted). 
170. Id. at 132. 
171. Id. at 134 (internal citation omitted). 
172. Id. at 135-36. 
173. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 597-98 (S.D. Tex.
2005) (finding widespread abuse in litigation screenings that followed the
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III. TRUST PERFORMANCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
According to some estimates, the historical weaknesses 
in the asbestos trust system have led to unwarranted
payments of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of
dollars.174 Although many trusts no longer accept medical
reports from the doctors involved in manufacturing asbestos 
claims in the past, they have not adopted audits designed to
identify similar patterns and practices today, and the
lingering propensity for trusts to accept and pay far more
claims than projected continues to interfere with efforts to 
provide equitable compensation for future claimants. This
section analyzes the public reports of the thirty-two trusts
identified in Part II and outlines the implications of the 
trusts’ claim payment and payment percentage adjustment 
patterns for future victims and future asbestos bankruptcy
cases.  
A. Assets and Payment Percentages 
From 2000 through 2006, bankruptcy trust payments
hovered around $500 million each year, spiking to slightly
more than $1 billion in 2004 before returning to the mean in 
2005.175 From 2007 through the end of 2011, verified
payments from bankruptcy trusts to claimants were $13.55
billion, or roughly 73% of the value of the assets remaining
in the trusts at the end of 2011 ($18.467 billion).176 As 
reflected in Figure 1, claim payments exceeded new
contributions to the trusts each year since 2008, and
collectively outpaced new trust funding by more than $5
billion.177 Payments as a percentage of total assets peaked at 
16.4% in 2009 and subsequently declined to 10.2% in 2011
as several trusts reduced their payment percentages.
174. Roger Parloff, Mass Tort Medicine Men, THE AM. LAWYER, Jan. 3, 2003, at
98 (estimating the cost to the Manville Trust from 1995 through 2001 at $190
million); accord Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screenings in Mass
Torts: A Formula for Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REV. 1221, 1341 (2008) (explaining how
billions of dollars in settlements may have been paid on account of specious
asbestos claims in tort and through the bankruptcy trust system). 
175. See Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 14, at 3, ex. 3. 
176. See id. at 3-5, exs. 2-5. 
177. See id. at 3, ex. 2 (approximately $3 billion of this difference was offset by
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Figure 1: New Trust Funding and Payments, 2007–2011 
This data does not tell the full story. The spike in
payments across trusts trails a period of rapid growth in
trust assets; as new trusts processed and paid thousands of
new claims submitted in connection with their corporate
predecessors’ bankruptcies, the aggregate trust payments 
increased dramatically. As the number and size of new
trusts declined, aggregate trust payments also slowed as
trusts that came on line from 2005 through 2009 finished
processing their initial claims. Even controlling for new
trust submissions, however, trust payments largely
exceeded projections in the latter part of the last decade.
Moreover, an analysis of the payment percentages
adopted at bankruptcy trusts in recent years demonstrates
that projections continue to underestimate claim
submissions and payments. In its 2010 report on asbestos
bankruptcy trusts, RAND Corporation found that only one 
of the twenty-nine trusts it analyzed–the T H Agriculture &
Nutrition Trust–applied a 100% payment percentage, and
that trust had not paid any claims through 2008.178 The
median payment percentage was 25%, and every trust 
included in the sample other than the THAN Trust paid less 
than 60%.179 
178. 2010 RAND REPORT, supra note 38, at 36-38 (noting that payment
percentages ranged from 1.1% to 100%, with a median of approximately 25%). 
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As reflected in Figure 2, twenty of the thirty-two trusts
surveyed have reduced their payment percentages since the
2010 RAND Report, and two others are in the process of
revising their payment percentages.180 These changes reflect
a decline in per-claim compensation of 9% to 93.33% from 
2010 levels, with a median of 38%. Shortly after the 2010
RAND REPORT was published, for example, the THAN Trust 
reduced its payment percentage from 100% to 30%.181 Thus,
although approved mesothelioma claims asserted against 
the trust in the THAN bankruptcy and settled at the
scheduled value for those claims ($150,000) in 2010 would
have been paid $150,000, current and future mesothelioma
claimants against the trust stand to receive less than one-
third of this amount ($45,000). As a result of these
adjustments, payment percentages today range from .5% to
70% and have a median of 14%.182 
180. The DII Trust recently announced its intention to reconsider its payment
percentage. See DII Industries, LLC Asbestos PI Trust Notice of Payment
Percentage Reconsideration (Feb. 22, 2013) [hereinafter DII Industries Notice],
available at
http://www.diiasbestostrust.org/files/20130222%20Notice%20of%20Payment%20 
Percentage%20Reconsideration.pdf (“This re-evaluation will likely result in a
reduction of the percentage.”). Moreover, this figure does not include the 
trustee’s proposed reduction of the Combustion Engineering payment
percentage, which was to be effective June 18, 2012, but is currently being
challenged by the TAC. See Notice to Holders of Combustion Engineering TDP
Claims (May 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.cetrust.org/docs/20120517_CE_Payment_Percentage_Notice.pdf. 
In addition, on April 9, 2013, the UNR Asbestos-Disease Claims Trust initiated
a moratorium on claims processing to “examine the Trust’s recent, material
increase in malignancy filings and review Trust payment procedures.” UNR
Claims Processing Moratorium Notice (Apr. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.cpf-inc.com/upload/temp/UNRMoratorium.pdf.
 181. See T H Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. Asbestos Personal Injury Trust
Payment Percentage Notice (Mar. 21, 2011) (on file with author).  
182. If trusts that have not reported completing their initial claim review— 
ACandS (5.78%), ASARCO (22%), Burns and Roe (25%), Christy Refractories
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Figure 2: Payment Percentage Reductions Since 2010
A trust’s decision to reduce its payment percentage
reflects that the trust previously underestimated its long-
term liabilities, overestimated its projected assets, or both. 
The recent surge in payment percentage reductions does not
appear to be driven primarily by lingering investment losses
associated with the recent financial crisis183 or significant 
increases in trust litigation and other expenses.184 Rather, 
these reductions reflect significant, lingering disparities in
projected and actual claim submissions and payments in
recent years. Indeed, where trusts have provided an explicit
explanation for the payment percentage reductions, they
have identified unexpected growth in claim submissions as
a significant factor in their decisions.185 
183. Although trust investments lost $2.137 billion in 2008, these investments 
gained $2.363 billion and $1.306 billion in 2009 and 2010, respectively. See 
Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 14, at 3, ex. 2. 
184. Trust expenses remain less than 1% of assets under management. Id. at
3, ex. 2.
 185. See, e.g., C.E. Thurston & Sons Asbestos Trust, Notice of Offer
Suspension (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.claimsres.com/documents/CET/Notice%20of%20Offer%20Suspension 
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This miscalculation begins during the bankruptcy case. 
Although estimation proceedings are common in asbestos
bankruptcies, they do not provide a basis for ensuring that
the trust is in position to pay current and future claimants 
equitably. These proceedings focus on the debtor’s long-term 
liability under state law, not the trust’s estimated lifetime
liabilities under its TDP. But the trusts’ liabilities under 
their TDPs, of course, will be significantly higher than the
debtor’s estimated tort system liability, given the TDPs’ 
generous terms.186 At most, the initial payment levels are 
negotiated between the claimants’ committee and the legal
representative for future claimants,187 but there is little in
the public record to determine whether and to what extent
these discussions occur prior to confirmation in any given
case. These estimates consistently fall short, thereby
allowing current claimants to obtain high initial recoveries
and requiring substantial reductions in payments to future
claimants.
B. The Impact on Future Victims 
Today’s current claimants are yesterday’s future 
claimants. And the rapid depletion of trust assets and 
corresponding payment percentage reductions means that
individual trusts will not pay them at the same levels as 
they paid similar claimants in the past. If these trends 
continue, today’s future claimants will receive less
compensation than the trusts pay now. In sum, although 
section 524(g) draws legitimacy from its focus on ensuring 
that claims will be treated in “substantially the same
manner” regardless of when they are submitted,188 
experience shows that equitable compensation across past, 
current and future claimants will not be realized.
significantly in excess of levels projected); see also Memorandum from the UNR 
Asbestos-Disease Claims Trust to Claimant’s Counsel (Mar. 21, 2011) (citing an
“unanticipated significant increase in claim filings” as the reason the Claims
Trust reduced its payment percentage to 0.82%).
 186. See discussion supra Part II.B.
187. Given that the debtors’ exposure will be capped by their contributions to
the trusts they establish, they do not typically take an active role in negotiating
TDPs. 
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Although this disparate treatment conflicts with the 
primary objective of section 524(g), a common defense of the 
trust system is that future victims are nonetheless better off
with an imperfect trust system than without it. As one court 
succinctly put it, “at least future claimants receive
something.”189 This is perhaps true as far as it goes in some 
cases, but it does not go far enough to have any meaning.
Even if trusts are currently capable of paying something to
current claimants, the ongoing downward trend in payment 
percentages at formerly well-financed trusts suggests that
more trusts will join the ranks of those that are currently 
inactive, have payments suspended intermittently in the
future, or pay such a small fraction of scheduled values that
the available recoveries no longer justify submitting claims.  
Moreover, section 524(g) is not limited to companies
that would be forced into liquidation otherwise. The Mid-
Valley bankruptcy, for example, ultimately channeled the 
liabilities of the Halliburton entities to the DII Industries 
(DII) Trust notwithstanding clear evidence that these
entities had no immediate or long-term risk of liquidation.190 
In capping this solvent company’s asbestos exposure at a
fixed amount, the court also capped the pool of assets
available for asbestos victims and imposed the full risk that
the trust might be underfunded on future victims. Today,
the DII Trust pays 52.5% of the assigned claim value, and, 
as noted previously, this percentage is likely to decline in
the near future.191 
The equitable compensation requirement also reflects 
the value created by binding future claimants to the trust.
Although defendants historically settled large volumes of
claims in blocks in an effort to manage their asbestos
liabilities,192 such wholesale settlements only encouraged 
more litigation and increasingly aggressive client
189. In re Quigley Co., 449 B.R. 196, 201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
190. Ronald Barliant et al., From Free-Fall to Free-For-All: The Rise of Pre-
Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 441, 451-52
(2004). To the contrary, the debtors “repeatedly advised the bankruptcy court
that they were solvent notwithstanding their asbestos liabilities.” Plevin et al.,
supra note 28, at 297 n.116. 
191. See ER Claim Values, DII INDUS., LLC ASBESTOS PI TRUST, 
http://www.diiasbestostrust.org/page.asp?page_id=43 (last visited Mar. 18,
2013); DII Industries Notice, supra note 180. 
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solicitations by plaintiffs’ firms. Few defendants today are
thus willing to enter into truly global settlements through 
private agreement without the “total peace”193 promised by
channeling future claims to the trust. Thus, impairing
future victims generates value for all claimants that would 
not otherwise be available.
Finally, the potential for future victims to offset these
lower trust values by obtaining larger judgments and
settlements in the tort system is no panacea. As states
adopt higher causation standards194 and many of the 
defendants remaining in the tort system have increasingly
tangential ties to the asbestos industry,195 future victims
193. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (2010) (discussing the impact of the defendants’
demands for “total peace” on the failed asbestos class actions of the late 1990s);
Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why and the How, 78 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 128 (2004) (stating that any defendant seeking “global
peace” would want all future claims behind it); see also Richard L. Marcus,
Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 
457, 474 (2001) (stating that defendants demand “global peace”).  
194. See Bernstein, supra note 128, at 59, 69. 
195. See Behrens, supra note 132, at 528 (“Now, an increasing number of
plaintiffs are bringing claims for de minimis or remote exposures, such as ‘shade 
tree’ brake work on the family car or one remodeling job using asbestos-
containing joint compound.”); Sheila Jasanoff & Dogan Perese, Welfare State or
Welfare Court: Asbestos Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 J.L. & POL’Y
619, 628 (2004) (“Defendants’ bankruptcies . . . have not dissuaded further
asbestos mass tort claims as might have been expected. Instead, plaintiffs’
lawyers are filing even more claims . . . against defendants whose involvement
with asbestos production is increasingly tangential.”); Richard A. Nagareda,
Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1171 n.223
(2010) (noting the expansion of asbestos personal injury litigation to “more
remote defendants outside the traditional asbestos industry”); David G. Owen, 
Against Priority, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 557, 561 (2008) (“Peripheral defendants
appear now to be bearing the largest burden of damage assessments in asbestos
litigation, but claims against them typically are weaker in terms of causation,
apportionment, and defensive challenges to the foreseeability of the risk. What
all this means is that the aggregate pot of available resources in asbestos
litigation appears to be increasingly insufficient to cover the many tens of
thousands of new claims, piled on top of hundreds of thousands of existing
claims, made upon the resource pot each year. Thus, a major aspect of the 
asbestos problem is one of limited funds.”) (internal citation omitted); Michelle
J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie Won’t Stay in the Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1319, 1340 (2002) (“The future of asbestos litigation will likely involve
claimants whose exposure to asbestos is increasingly fleeting. Moreover, these
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appear to be less likely to obtain full compensation for their
injuries, even in states with relatively low joint liability
thresholds. Although commentators often refer to asbestos
personal injury litigation as though the collective pool of 
assets available for victims is limitless, this does not mean
that each individual plaintiff will be able to obtain full
recovery through bankruptcy trusts and the tort system.
Some current plaintiffs may be able to make up some of the
difference by obtaining compensation from trusts against
which they have little or no actual evidence of exposure, but
this depletes the pool of assets that would otherwise be 
available to plaintiffs with strong evidence of exposure to
these trusts’ predecessors’ products.
C. Implications for Future Asbestos Bankruptcies 
Just as defendants require peace as a condition of global
settlement, lawyers who control sufficient votes to veto any
section 524(g) plan frequently seek a premium for their
support. In the asbestos “pre-pack” bankruptcies of the ear-
ly 2000s, this premium frequently took the form of a two-
tier trust or similar settlement structure that effectively 
front-loaded payments to lead plaintiffs’ firms’ current cli-
ents and left only a fraction of the funds set aside for asbes-
tos claims for other current and future victims.196 And prior 
to 2004, lower courts routinely accepted these plans not-
withstanding section 524(g)’s requirement that current and
future claims receive substantially the same treatment. Fol-
lowing the Third Circuit’s criticism of the two-tier bank-
ruptcy trust model in Combustion Engineering, Inc.197 and 
subsequent critique of the conflicts of interests underlying a
similar plan in Congoleum Corp., 198 plan proponents have
largely abandoned two-tier and similar asbestos bankruptcy 
settlements. 
Nonetheless, the inequities and self-dealing concerns that
animated the Third Circuit’s analyses in Combustion 
asbestos products is increasingly tangential. These claims will likely be
increasingly difficult to win at trial.”). 
196. For a detailed discussion of these “pre-pack” bankruptcies, see Mark D.
Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX.
L. REV. 883 (2003). 
197. In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 240-42 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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Engineering and Congoleum remain. New trusts may pay
the initial wave of claims at a high rate and postpone any
revisions to payment percentages until after this initial re-
view is complete, even where early claim data suggests that
the projections that supported the initial payment percent-
age were flawed.199 After the claimants who voted on the
plan are paid, the downward revisions to payment percent-
ages can begin. We are left with a system in which few 
trusts continue to pay claims at historic highs, and roughly
two-thirds are paying claims at historic lows.200 
This continuing trend raises serious questions concern-
ing the confirmation of future asbestos bankruptcy plans.
The bankruptcy trust system is long past the point where
participants can look at the rapid depletion of newly-
established trusts as unanticipated and unintended conse-
quences of generous compensation criteria. Bankruptcy
trusts continue to employ largely the same claim criteria, 
are managed by many of the same players from one to the 
next, and, with few exceptions, approach claim audits and 
quality control in the same manner. If we can be reasonably
assured of anything, it is that a trust that employs the same
criteria and follows the same practices as its predecessors is
extremely unlikely to “value, and be in a financial position
to pay, present claims and future demands that involve sim-
ilar claims in substantially the same manner” as required 
by section 524(g).201 And unless future plan proponents can
provide reasonable assurances that the proposed trust’s cri-
teria, practices and audit plans are sufficiently tailored to 
address these historical weaknesses, it is difficult to fathom 
how the judges overseeing these cases can conclude that
199. See Kirk T. Hartley et al.,  Pre-Packaged Plan of Inequity: The Financial
Abuse of Future Claimants in the T H Agriculture and Nutrition 524(g) Asbestos
Bankruptcy, MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP., Nov. 2011, at 31 (discussing how
this unfolded in the THAN bankruptcy and subsequent trust, notwithstanding
the fact that the legal representative appointed in that case appears to have 
challenged plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain undue premiums throughout the 
bankruptcy case). Although some defense lawyers assert that this disparity is 
driven by manipulation of the individual review process–namely that preferred
firms’ clients receive payments far in excess of their respective schedule values
in order to obtain their favorable votes on the plan of reorganization–these
assertions cannot be tested empirically because the trusts do not disclose claim-
level data. 
200. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
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they provide reasonable assurance of equitable compensa-
tion for future victims.
IV. RESTORING THE PROMISE OF SECTION 524(g) 
If we view section 524(g) as a statutory experiment,202 it 
has been an effective proof-of-concept whose shortcomings
are attributable to statutory gaps and failures in enforce-
ment and monitoring rather than intrinsic flaws in its
premise. Bankruptcy has an inherently collective focus, and
it is intended to ensure that all parties’ interests are ade-
quately represented even when those parties are unable to
speak for themselves. The weaknesses observed in asbestos 
bankruptcies to date stem from the vague parameters of
this representation, the absence of any meaningful post-
confirmation trust oversight and disclosure provisions, and
the courts’ limited options for bringing recalcitrant parties
to the bargaining table in contested cases. These flaws, ra-
ther than any intrinsic weakness in the trust-injunction
framework, generate the shortcomings of section 524(g). 
Historically, critics have focused most of their attention
on developing proposals for modifying the process for estab-
lishing trusts,203 but such changes will do little to alter the 
management of the roughly $30 billion in assets held or
soon to be held by existing trusts. Even with respect to 
these trusts, however, considerable opportunities for ad-
vancing the objectives of section 524(g) remain. This section
outlines the potential benefits and costs of recent transpar-
ency initiatives and the potential scale economies across
trusts that create opportunities for reducing existing admin-
istrative burdens and limiting the costs of a more robust
cross-trust disclosure and audit system.  
202. The legislative history of Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code suggests
that it was intended to not only codify the Manville approach in asbestos cases 
but also serve as a test case to determine “whether the [trust-injunction] concept
should be extended into other areas.” 140 CONG. REC. H. 27,692 (1994). 
203. See, e.g., Barliant et al., supra note 190, at 468-69 (praising courts that
reject pre-packs for fundamental fairness); Brown, supra note 1, 932-33 (arguing
for systematic changes in the asbestos bankruptcy process); Plevin et al., supra 
note 28 (arguing for reform in the selection of future claimants’ representatives
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A. Claim Transparency 
Transparency has been a critical component of reforms
aimed at unwinding and preventing abuse; allowing credi-
tors, the United States trustee, courts, other parties in in-
terest and, ultimately, Congress to identify and address
these shortcomings and preserve the integrity of the bank-
ruptcy process.204 Given the level of private control over
trust management and claim processing, the absence of
comparable transparency within the trust system necessar-
ily raises concerns about whether the funds are adminis-
tered in a manner consistent with the objectives of Section
524(g).205 Indeed, although trust officials and trust critics
frequently make sweeping statements about the amount of
fraud in the bankruptcy trust system, no one person or or-
ganization currently has access to sufficient information 
across trusts to provide any meaningful empirical assess-
ment of the extent to which fraudulent claims are, or are 
not, prevalent in the bankruptcy trust system. This neces-
sarily limits their potential to identify dubious claiming pat-
terns, and it likewise limits the information available for
predicting the impact of changes to their criteria and qual-
ity control mechanisms.
Moreover, the focus on claim-level transparency holds
particular promise as a means of modifying trust manage-
ment. Although bankruptcy trusts tend to be reactive rather
than proactive, they appear to be attuned to the broader 
public perception of their activities and place a premium on 
managing negative public opinion. For example, substan-
tially all of the trusts that were active at the time of the Sil-
ica MDL acted quickly to disqualify the doctors in screening
204. See Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency (FACT) Act of 2012: Hearing 
on H.R. 4369 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 26-28 (2012) (statement of Professor S.
Todd Brown).  
205. See In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2012); In 
re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 693 (3d Cir. 2005) (“As this case
demonstrates, leaving the procedures for allocation of resources predominantly
in the hands of private, conflicting interests has led to problems of fair and
equal resolution. The need for counsel with undivided loyalties is more pressing
in cases of this nature than in more familiar conventional litigation.
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companies involved in the fraud uncovered in that case.206 
Of course, to do otherwise in the face of clear fraud and 
abuse is to invite litigation and legislative or judicial sec-
ond-guessing of the trusts’ operations and management. At
the same time, enhanced claim transparency may discour-
age claim submissions that omit critical information or con-
flict with the claimant’s representations to other trusts and 
in the tort system. The trusts’ confidentiality and sole bene-
fit provisions may simplify claim processing, but they also
create opportunities for avoiding detection when claim 
forms omit unfavorable information or conflict with sworn
representations elsewhere. Conversely, a more transparent
system should improve state courts’, defendants’, and vigi-
lant trust officials’ access to the information they need to 
identify and address such manipulation.
1. Recent Transparency Proposals. In the last two years,
legislators at both the state and federal level have consid-
ered far-reaching legislation aimed at reducing the secrecy
that surrounds trust claim submissions today. The state
and federal proposals are generally referred to by similar 
names—the Asbestos Claims Transparency Act (for state-
level initiatives) and the Furthering Asbestos Claims Trans-
parency Act of 2012 (federal)207—and are supported by
largely identical interest groups, so it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that many legislators, lawyers, opposing interest groups
and others frequently appear to confuse the state and fed-
eral proposals. Yet these proposals have few overlapping 
provisions and target distinct concerns in the intersection of
bankruptcy trusts and state tort law.
At the state level, Ohio’s recently-passed transparency
act, H.B. 380,208 is less a public transparency bill than a
framework for managing the discovery of bankruptcy trust
submissions and payments in tort litigation in Ohio state
courts. Indeed, it does not provide for public disclosure of
trust information outside of the discovery process or other-
wise address trust governance. Among other things, this act 
206. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens, Asbestos Litigation Screening Challenges: An
Update, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 721, 724-25 (2009). 
207. Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency (FACT) Act of 2012, H.R. 4369,
112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012) [hereinafter FACT Act]. The FACT Act was passed
out of committee, but it was not put before the full House for a vote. 
208. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.952 (West 2013) (this act became effective on
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provides that asbestos personal injury plaintiffs must pro-
vide defendants with a sworn statement “identifying all ex-
isting asbestos trust claims” made by the plaintiff and “all 
trust claims material pertaining to each identified asbestos 
trust claim” within thirty days of the commencement of dis-
covery or submission of the trust claim.209 Moreover, defen-
dants are authorized to request a stay of the state tort ac-
tion for the purpose of requiring the plaintiff to submit ad-
ditional claims to bankruptcy trusts.210 Other states have
considered or are expected to consider similar legislation in
the near future. 
At the federal level, following a failed effort to amend
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to require man-
datory disclosure of trust submissions and payments,211 leg-
islation to amend the Bankruptcy Code to require these dis-
closures was introduced in 2012.212 Specifically, the FACT 
Act proposed amending section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy
Code to require quarterly reports from the each trust that
described “each demand the trust received from, including
the name and exposure history of, a claimant and the basis 
for any payment from the trust made to such claimant” dur-
ing the quarter.213 These disclosures would not include con-
fidential medical records or the claimant’s full social secu-
rity number.214 In addition, the FACT Act required trusts to
disclose trust claim forms and supporting documentation to 
defendants in related state tort litigation.215 
2. Striking the Appropriate Balance. Although distinct 
in focus and operation, critics contend that both proposals
will unduly increase the costs and delays associated with
trust administration and state tort litigation.216 In addition,
209. Id.
 210. Id. § 2307.953(B). 
211. FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 105, at 13-14. 
212. Id.
 213. FACT Act, supra note 207, at § 2. 
214. Id. This tracks Bankruptcy Rule 9037(a), which allows parties to include
only the last four digits of their social security number where the number is
required.
 215. See id.
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critics contend that the FACT Act is “an assault against as-
bestos victims’ privacy interests.”217 These objections iden-
tify concerns that should be considered in any transparency
proposal. After all, any such proposal will entail costs and
carry the potential for revealing private information that
may be embarrassing or subject to misuse in the wrong
hands. These concerns are discussed in turn.
a. Avoiding Unnecessary Costs and Delays. The Ohio
legislation clearly imposes additional requirements upon
plaintiffs early in the litigation process, though many of
these costs will be incurred regardless of when trust claims
are filed. And in empowering defendants to pursue a stay of
the proceedings and litigate questions concerning the plain-
tiffs’ potential trust recoveries in state court, the act may
provide defendants with an opportunity to delay (and in-
crease the cost of) state court proceedings until these ques-
tions are resolved. Although this raises the specter of defen-
dants simply seeking stays for the sole purpose of prolong-
ing the litigation, plaintiffs may pre-empt such requests by
filing all of their expected trust claims early in the case or
avoid the stay by filing claims with the trusts identified by
the defendant within the statutory period.218 Moreover,
courts overseeing these cases retain discretion to limit abu-
sive stay requests.219 
While the various state-level initiatives impose direct
costs on plaintiffs and their counsel, the FACT Act imposes
additional obligations on bankruptcy trusts only.220 Plain-
tiffs will face additional delays only if the trusts are unable 
to meet these obligations without interfering with claim re-
view and payment. These costs will be offset to a degree by
reducing state tort defendants’ shotgun-style discovery re-
quests to trusts, and any trust claim payment delays may 
likewise be offset by discouraging plaintiffs’ firms from de-
217. Id. at 29 (dissenting views). 
218. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.953(C)(1)(a) (West 2013) (explaining a
stay motion is disposed of upon demonstration that trust claims have been 
submitted). 
219. See id. § 2307.953(D) (stating defendant must demonstrate that claims
can be submitted to the trusts in good faith, and plaintiffs are not required to
submit claims where the costs of doing so will exceed the potential recovery).
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laying submissions to avoid this discovery.221 Moreover, to 
further offset any additional costs to the trusts, the final
version of the FACT Act authorized trusts to assess discov-
ery-related fees from state tort defendants.222 
b. Resolving Privacy Concerns. Perhaps the most stri-
dent critique of the FACT Act is that it “could further vic-
timize unsuspecting asbestos victims by requiring informa-
tion about their illness to be made publically available to
anyone who has access to the Internet.”223 This is so because
the act would require trusts to file quarterly claim-level re-
ports with the bankruptcy court, and these reports would 
become part of the public docket for the bankruptcy case in
which the trust was established.224 These reports, in turn,
might “be used by data collectors and other entities for pur-
poses that have absolutely nothing to do with compensation 
for asbestos exposure.”225 
With respect to public transparency, the policy question
is not one of dueling absolutes (i.e., public disclosure of large 
volumes of potentially embarrassing or damaging private
information versus no disclosure of any claim-level informa-
tion); it is whether sufficient claim transparency can be
achieved without undermining plaintiffs’ legitimate privacy 
interests. Of course, it is possible to protect a claimant’s 
anonymity without fully shielding relevant information con-
cerning her claims from public scrutiny, just as it is possible
to tailor claim-level disclosures so that the information is of
no use to identity thieves and other data collectors with ne-
farious motives.  
This balancing of interests is hardly novel. To the con-
trary, debtors provide similar information about their credi-
tors pursuant to section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code, and 
Official Form B10 (the proof of claim) requires all credi-
tors—including tort creditors—to disclose their names, ad-
dresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, the legal and
factual foundations for their claims, and “copies of any doc-
uments that support the claim[s]” in connection with sub-
221. See 2011 RAND REPORT, supra note 104, at 19. 
222. FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 105, at 28. 
223. Id. at 31 (dissenting views).
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mitting a claim. Many plaintiffs have historically filed this
information through their counsel in asbestos bankrupt-
cies226 and in connection with their personal injury cases in
state court.227 Indeed, the API Trust already releases this 
information in its annual reports,228 and there is no evidence
that this data has been misused. Finally, documents on the 
public dockets in several closed asbestos bankruptcy cases
are not available on the Internet today,229 and courts have
the flexibility to otherwise modify access where necessary to
avoid misuse.230 
Ultimately, the level of transparency required to iden-
tify and deter specious claims, promote confidence in the 
trust system and otherwise protect future victims’ interests
is lower than already required of other bankruptcy credi-
tors. Claim-level analysis requires no more than sufficient 
information for independent outsiders to distinguish claims
across trusts and match these claims to the applicable
plaintiffs’ cases in the tort system. Limiting personal identi-
fication to the claimant’s last name and last four social se-
curity number digits should be sufficient for this purpose 
and preserve the claimant’s anonymity with respect to all 
parties other than their named defendants in the tort sys-
tem. Named defendants will have access to sufficient infor-
mation through that litigation to make the connections nec-
essary to protect their interests.
226. For example, some of this information is currently available in the
Flintkote claims register. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Administration Website, THE
FLINTKOTE CO., http://cert.gardencitygroup.com/flk/fs/searchcr (last visited Apr.
7, 2013).  
227. For example, plaintiff names and diseases are routinely disclosed in
submissions and orders that are freely available on the New York City asbestos
litigation website. See New York City Asbestos Litigation Website, NYCAL,
http://www.nycal.net/index.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
 228. See, e.g., API Inc. Asbestos Settlement Trust, Annual Report of the
Trustee, No. 05-30073, Dkt. No. 611 (Bankr. D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2012). 
229. Bankruptcy courts have increasingly closed asbestos bankruptcy cases
following plan confirmation, and Internet access to these closed cases on PACER 
is limited to docket reports. Thus, those seeking access to documents in these 
closed cases must either be parties to the case or acquire them manually.  
230. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 327 B.R. 554, 560 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)
(stating bankruptcy court acted appropriately in limiting electronic access to 
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B. Leveraging Economies of Scale 
Much of the appeal of the recent transparency initia-
tives comes from the previously noted pause that attends to 
any process that places so much control over asset distribu-
tion in the hands of interested parties. These concerns are
amplified by the growing secrecy that surrounds trust ad-
ministration and examples of trust-related claim fraud or,
at least, manipulation that have been uncovered notwith-
standing this secrecy. Collectively, the trusts’ efforts to pre-
serve the appearance as conscientious stewards of assets for
the sole benefit of legitimate victims seem unlikely to hold
over the long term barring more meaningful change to their 
operations, audit practices, and willingness to accept inde-
pendent outside review. 
Beyond the need for transparency and audit plans that 
do not require the consent of TACs, the growth of the bank-
ruptcy trust system has generated a potential for coopera-
tion and sharing of common tasks that has not been realized 
to date. Most trusts employ similar claim criteria, process
claims advanced by the same professionals and plaintiffs, 
and are confronting similar challenges in balancing the in-
terests of current and future victims. Although some trust 
administrators have recognized and taken advantage of the 
potential economies of scale these common features provide
within the trusts they serve, this potential is far more sig-
nificant if extended across trusts regardless of the claim 
administrator. This consolidation of administration and 
quality control efforts provides a far more cost-effective and 
robust system for processing claims, discouraging abuse, 
and avoiding conflicts with state efforts to manage ongoing 
asbestos litigation.
Moreover, as more state courts authorize tort defendant 
discovery into plaintiffs’ trust submissions, a centralized 
filing system may provide comparable economies of scale for 
the benefit of trusts and tort litigants alike. Trusts are in-
creasingly besieged with document requests, many of which 
concern plaintiffs who have not even submitted claims to 
them. Channeling these requests to a centralized claim 
submission administrator can thus allow trusts to avoid the
time and expense associated with responding to inapplica-
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one-stop shop for verifying trust submissions across multi-
ple trusts, thereby avoiding the need to subpoena this in-
formation across numerous trusts and reducing the associ-
ated costs and delays.
The primary drawback to this approach is the up-front
costs of developing a uniform filing system across trust ad-
ministrators who currently employ different forms and may
require integration of proprietary software. Although ad-
ministrators may have found competitive advantages in
centralizing claim submissions across the trusts they serve,
they stand to lose these advantages under a broader con-
solidation of the trust submission process. And the transi-
tion from a system with numerous, diverse individual sub-
mission systems to a consolidated filing system may also
delay and confuse filings in the short term. As suggested 
previously, however, trusts may offset these costs by charg-
ing fees for responding to claim inquiries and modest, reim-
bursable claim submission fees to claimants.
The adoption of a mandatory system-wide claim-level
audit plan free from interference by the trusts’ respective 
TACs likewise has promise. Given the overlap in relevant
data, parties, and practices in claim submissions, trusts 
could pool their aggregate claim data for random and strati-
fied sampling. This should improve the trusts’ ability to 
identify suspicious claim patterns and practices and allow 
for targeted audits of a sample of these claims.231 Cross-trust 
claim audits should also reduce each trust’s individual costs 
associated with the audit by dividing these costs across the 
participating trusts. And by tracking claims asserted by
each claimant across all or substantially all of the active
trusts, such a centralized audit system is far more likely to
uncover materially conflicting representations from one 
trust to the next even in the absence of a centralized filing
system. In sum, such an approach would yield more data for
identifying suspicious claim patterns, provide economies of 
scale to improve the economic feasibility of such audits, and
discourage claimants and repeat players from submitting 
claims based on conflicting representations.
231. See Brown, Specious Claims, supra note 135, at 621-22 (discussing the
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C. The Need for Legislative Action 
Bankruptcy trust officials appear focused on sustaining 
an image of the system as striking an appropriate balance 
between deterring specious claims and managing the costs 
of doing so. Today, this strategy centers on preserving the 
confidentiality of claims and mounting aggressive chal-
lenges to efforts to inquire into trust submissions and pay-
ments. Although this strategy may be seen as a way of lim-
iting undue public criticism of the trust system, it ulti-
mately backfires when clear examples of fraud and abuse
become public knowledge. As these examples continue to
appear232 and trust officials continue to deny that there is
any fraud,233 even those who may be inclined to give trusts
the benefit of the doubt will harbor doubts about the trusts’
credibility and quality controls. 
Bankruptcy trusts still have time to get out ahead of
legislative efforts, though they appear unlikely to change
course. Each of the public transparency, centralization of
claim submissions and disclosure and cross-trust audit
mechanisms outlined above can be implemented across
trusts privately. From a governance standpoint, however,
any measure to roll back the secrecy surrounding claim-
level data is unlikely to draw the consent of TAC members 
across trusts. As noted previously, centralizing claim sub-
missions and discovery management is unlikely beyond cur-
rent levels. Though the costs of an independent, comprehen-
sive cross-trust claim audit program may be relatively mod-
est if shared across multiple trusts, this, too, is unlikely to 
overcome the need for TAC consent at all of the relevant 
trusts. If, however, the trust system can overcome these in-
ternal obstacles and demonstrate a firm commitment to 
232. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text; see also Complaint, In re 
Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC, 10-BK-31607 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. June 4, 2012)
(alleging fraud in a pre-bankruptcy asbestos case, in which plaintiffs’ attorneys
were allegedly aware of conflicting representations in the state court proceeding
and ballots submitted in connection with asbestos bankruptcy cases and failed
to disclose the latter as required in the state proceeding); Pretrial Hearing
Transcript, In re Asbestos Litig. (Montgomery v. Am. Steel & Wire Corp.), 09C-
11-217, at 3 (Del. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 2011) (criticizing plaintiff’s conduct in
concealing trust submissions as “egregiously bad behavior,” “misrepresenting,”
and “trying to defraud” and noting that such conduct “is an example of the 
games that are being played”). 
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greater transparency, aggressive quality control, or both, it
may avoid more sweeping regulatory interventions down
the road. 
In the absence of private reform, the case for prompt 
regulatory action at the state and federal level is compel-
ling. As noted, the depletion of trust assets continues at an
alarming rate. Some active trusts have reduced payments 
so far that they appear on the verge of becoming inactive.
Others have taken aggressive actions to preserve assets
through adopting low payment percentages, but in doing so
they have ensured that current and future victims will re-
ceive far less than past victims received. Once depleted,
these funds will not be recovered, and as noted previously, 
this depletion increases the divide between future plaintiffs’
losses and their potential recoveries across trusts and in the
tort system. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the limits of the class action device, multidistrict
litigation and other aggregative mechanisms; bankruptcy’s 
appeal as a means of bringing finality to complex mass
harm litigation is obvious. Yet the trust system also demon-
strates the danger of employing the power of the bank-
ruptcy process to bind claimants without strict adherence to 
its case oversight, claim review, cram-down and other 
mechanisms for balancing stakeholder interests. Today’s 
trust shortfalls are the product of yesterday’s policy failures 
in the design and application of section 524(g), and this his-
tory suggests that shortfalls are virtually certain tomorrow
given the continuing misalignment of private incentives and 
public policy.
As demonstrated, however, the barriers to achieving the 
promise of section 524(g) are surmountable. Enhanced
transparency in this area appears likely to influence trust 
management, deter specious claims, and improve trust de-
sign over the long term without undermining claimants’
privacy interests. Moreover, a centralized submission and 
audit framework should produce considerable scale econo-
mies and enable the trusts to employ far more effective and
efficient claim audits and other quality controls. The legiti-
macy of this process hinges upon the willingness of bank-
ruptcy trusts to adopt—or, given the internal difficulties of 
voluntary adoption, for courts and Congress to demand—a 
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trust assets for the benefit of legitimate future victims. The 
question at this stage is whether we will continue to follow
the practices and procedures that have failed future victims 
for a quarter century or take advantage of the remaining
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Appendix A 
Payment Percentages 







API, Inc. Asbestos 
Settlement Trust 













7.5 15 -50.00% X 
C.E. Thurston & 
Sons Asbestos Trust
25 41 -39.02% X 
Celotex Asbestos
Settlement Trust 
9.4 14.1 -33.33% X 
Combustion
Engineering 524(g)
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7.4 8.6 -13.95% X 
H. K. Porter Asbestos 
Trust 
4 6.3 -36.51% X 














0.8 1.1 -27.27% X 
Leslie Controls 40 40
Lummus 524(g)
Asbestos PI Trust 
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NGC Bodily Injury 
Trust 
18 55 -67.27% X 
Owens Corning 8.8 10 -12.00% X 
Plibrico 524(g) Trust 1 8.5 -88.24% X 
Porter Hayden 
Bodily Injury Trust









70 100 -30.00% X 
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Appendix B 














6 mos. 5 years Y N
API, Inc. Asbestos 
Settlement Trust







nonmal - none; 


















nonmal - none; 




C.E. Thurston & Sons 
Asbestos Trust
7.3(a)(3)





















































































Asbestos PI Trust 
5.3(a)(3)
meso and level 1 









nonmal - none; 





Asbestos PI Trust 
5.3(a)(3)
Meso, LC2, L1
nonmal - none; 















nonmal - none; 






nonmal L1 - none; 










nonmal - none; 



































































J.T. Thorpe Company 
Successor Trust
5.6(b)(1)









Meso - 3 mos or at
least 10% but can 
be 1 mo. At reduced 
value; all others at
least 1 year or 25%
of exposure but can 
be as low as 3 mos 
at lower value




Personal Injury Trust 
5.3(a)(3)
Meso, LC2, L1
nonmal L1 - none; 







Meso & LC1 - none; 





Meso & LC2 - none; 





Asbestos PI Trust 
5.2(a)(3)
Meso, LC2, L1
nonmal L1 - none; 








Meso, LC1 and  L1 
Other - none; 















































































NA N N 
Owens Corning 5.3(a)(3)
Meso, LC2, L1
nonmal L1 - none; 




Plibrico 524(g) Trust 5.2(a)(3)
Meso, LC2, L1
nonmal L1 - none; 





































nonmal L1 - none; 

















































nonmal L1 - none; 







Meso - 3 mos or at
least 10% but can 
be 1 mo. at reduced 
value; all others at
least 1 year or 25%
of exposure but can 
be as low as 3 mos 
at lower value
NA Y N 















































API, Inc. Asbestos 
Settlement Trust 
5.1(m); 7.2 N Mandatory; Reasonable request



































































    
  










































Leslie Controls 5.7 Y Discretionary
Lummus 524(g)











   































NGC Bodily Injury 
Trust 
3.12 N Mandatory
Owens Corning 5.8 Y Discretionary



























UNR 5.8 Y Discretionary
